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HOW CONSERVATIVE IS THE REHNQUIST COURT?.
THREE ISSUES, ONE ANSWER
Staci Rosche*
INTRODUCrION
In the years following the appointment of William Rehnquist as
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, many commenta-
tors predicted a significant conservative shift by the Court.' Particu-
larly in light of subsequent Reagan and Bush appointees, the Court
appeared poised to mount a counter-revolution against the precedents
of the Warren and, to a lesser extent, the Burger Courts.2 But the
1992 election of President Bill Clinton resulted in two moderate ap-
pointments3 which left the leanings of the Court uncertain.
This Note presents a comparative study of the Supreme Court's de-
cisions from 1981-1985 ("the Burger Court") and from 1991-1995
("the Rehnquist Court") in order to determine what, if any, shift in
the Court's agenda can be demonstrated statistically.4 After all the
data were compiled, three areas were selected for further analysis:
discrimination, free expression, and criminal law. As this Note reveals
below, this study provided particularly interesting data in the area of
civil rights. At first glance, a comparison of all discrimination deci-
sions, including race and nationality, gender, age, and disability-based
* Thanks to Professor Robert Kaczorowski for his patience and support. Special
thanks to Tommy for putting up with me. For my Dad, whom I miss.
1. See David G. Savage, Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist Supreme
Court 453 (1992) [hereinafter Savage, Turning Right] ("With the change in member-
ship, the [liberal] old agenda has been pronounced dead."); Bernard Schwartz, A His-
tory of the Supreme Court 364 (1993) [hereinafter Schwartz, A History] ("Nor can it
be doubted that the line is being drawn farther to the right by the Rehnquist Court
than it was by its immediate predecessors."); Harold J. Spaeth, The Attitudinal
Model, in Contemplating Courts 296, 304 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995) (classifying the Bur-
ger and Rehnquist Courts as conservative); D.F.B. Tucker, The Rehnquist Court and
Civil Rights 211 (1995) (referring to both the Burger and Rehnquist Courts as con-
servative); Christopher E. Smith & Avis A. Jones, The Rehnquist Court's Activism
and the Risk of Injustice, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 53, 53-54 (1993) (stating that the emerging
conservative majority would control the outcome of most decisions).
2. Savage, supra note 1, at 453-58.
3. Until Chief Justice Burger retired, President Reagan had appointed only one
Justice, Sandra Day O'Connor. Savage, supra note 1, at 5. New Justices since Rehn-
quist's appointment as Chief Justice include Reagan appointees Antonin Scalia and
Anthony Kennedy, Bush appointees David Souter and Clarence Thomas, and Clinton
appointees Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer. Notably, while the Burger
Court era studied here experienced only the addition of Justice O'Connor, the Rehn-
quist Court underwent significant changes during the period studied here with the
additions of Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer. But there have been no changes in mem-
bership since the period studied here.
4. Although such designations are generally used to refer to all terms during the
tenure of a Chief Justice, "the Burger Court" and "the Rehnquist Court" will be used
herein to refer to the two five-year periods studied in this Note.
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claims, demonstrates little change in decisions between the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts: The Rehnquist Court found for the minority-
plaintiff 68% of the time as compared to 71% of the time by the Bur-
ger Court.5 A closer examination demonstrates, however, that while
overall, decisions in favor of alleged victims of discrimination re-
mained consistent over time, the Rehnquist Court reversed the trend
with respect to race-based claims. While 64% of Burger Court deci-
sions favored racial minorities, only 25% of the Rehnquist Court's de-
cisions benefited alleged victims of racial discrimination.6 A
comparison of voting rights decisions during these two eras further
supports the conclusion that the Rehnquist Court was particularly aus-
tere with race-based claims, but otherwise supported plaintiffs who
have alleged non-racially-based discrimination claims, even finding in
favor of civil rights challenges by and for prisoners more often than
those posed by and for racial minorities.7
In contrast, however, the Rehnquist Court appeared more protec-
tive than the Burger Court of the First Amendment freedom of ex-
pression. While the Burger Court protected the right only 52% of the
time, the Rehnquist Court did so 79% of the time.8 Closer examina-
tion of these cases indicates that the Rehnquist Court actively ex-
panded the scope of First Amendment protections, extending
protection to areas as diverse as hate speech and commercial speech.
Finally, the Rehnquist Court seemingly demonstrated a slightly in-
creased sympathy for criminal defendants than the Burger Court
evinced, finding for the defendant 33% of the time in criminal law
cases versus 27% under the Burger Court.' 0 This Note argues, how-
ever, that these statistics reflect the stabilization of a conservative
criminal law jurisprudence rather than a reversal of the Burger
Court's conservative trend."
Part I of this Note describes the methods used to collect data and
the outcome of that effort. Part II addresses the implications of the
Rehnquist Court's reversal of the Burger Court's pattern of favoring
plaintiffs in race-based discrimination claims. Part III analyzes the
Rehnquist Court's increased support of First Amendment freedom of
expression as compared with the Burger Court. Part IV details the
differences between the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' criminal law
agendas, arguing that the Rehnquist Court's emphasis on sentencing,
rules, and statutory interpretation questions indicates that it is solidi-
fying pro-prosecution criminal procedure precedents of the Burger
5. See infra app. at tbl. 2-a.
6. See infra app. at tbl. 2-b.
7. See infra note 33 and accompanying text.
8. See infra app. at tbl. 2-c.
9. See infra part III.
10. See infra app. at tbl. 2-d.
11. See infra part IV.
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and early Rehnquist Courts. This Note concludes that although the
Rehnquist Court's discrimination and First Amendment decisions ap-
pear inconsistent when viewed as a question of liberal or conservative
doctrine, upon closer examination, these decisions are in fact consis-
tent with the Rehnquist Court's emphasis on protecting the rights of
the majority. In particular, the Court demonstrated its fundamental
philosophy by rejecting affirmative action and minority-majority vot-
ing districts while simultaneously protecting hate speech. In practice,
this preference for the majority did not lead the Rehnquist Court to
defer to legislative decisions. Instead, the Rehnquist Court protected
the majority as a class from government intrusions or limitations cre-
ated to redress racial inequities. While this simple majoritarianism re-
sulted in greater protections for the freedom of expression, it also all
but banished the interests of racial minorities from the nation's high-
est Court.
I. METHODS
Data was gathered from the Supreme Court Reporter for the terms
1981-1985 and 1991-1995. The period from 1981-1985 was chosen be-
cause it was the end of the Burger Court and preceded significant
changes in the membership of the Court. Only full, signed decisions
were considered from each term.12 Each full decision was placed in
one or two of forty-five categories. Unlike other studies which have
focused on sweeping issues such as due process or civil liberties,13 the
categories in this study were based on the specific issue addressed,
ranging from abortion to arbitration, federal regulation of private en-
tities to discrimination claims, labor to separation of powers. After
12. The Rehnquist Court produced 448 such opinions, and the Burger Court ren-
dered 728 such opinions. It should be noted that in the interim between the periods
studied here, Congress ended the requirement that the Supreme Court automatically
review a decision of the highest State court in which that court held a federal law to
be invalid. See Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988) (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994)). The previously automatic appeals were converted to
petitions for certiorari. H.R. Rep. No. 100-660, 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 776, 778. However, this change was not treated as significant for pur-
poses of this study because the change was made to eliminate a line of cases regarding
"arcane and technical provisions of its jurisdiction," the majority of which were dis-
posed of without briefing or oral argument, and resulted in "murky precedential
value." Id. at 776. The Supreme Court itself claimed that while such automatic ap-
peals accounted for 36% of the cases it decided in the 1980 term, most were issues of
little significance that resulted in summary decisions without written opinions, ld. at
781-82. Therefore, although the elimination of automatic appeal may have contrib-
uted to the reduction in the total number of decisions issued by the Court, it was
unlikely to have had a significant effect on the full, signed opinions that were the
focus of this study.
13. See, e.g., Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., The Transformation of the Supreme Court's
Agenda from the New Deal to the Reagan Administration 203 (1991) [hereinafter
Pacelle, Transformation]; Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Assessing the
Conservatism of the Rehnquist Court, 77 Judicature 83, 85 (1993).
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being categorized, each case was assigned a beneficiary. 14 In the crim-
inal law category, for example, each case was marked as a decision
benefiting the government or the defendant. Once compiled, the data
were arranged in a database and the percent of decisions benefiting
each side was determined. Four hundred forty-eight cases were cate-
gorized from the Rehnquist Court, while 728 decisions were catego-
rized from the Burger Court. 15 Because some cases qualified in more
than one category, however, the adjusted total of cases per five year
interval-counting each time a decision appeared in a category-was
511 and 806 decisions, respectively. Furthermore, because the Court
dramatically reduced the number of full opinions issued,' 6 the total
number of cases in each category always appears substantially differ-
ent between eras. But this gulf is misleading. To provide proportional
data, the total number of decisions was converted into a percent of
total cases decided, e.g., seventy Rehnquist Court and 115 Burger
Court criminal justice decisions accounted for 13.7% and 14.3% of the
adjusted total number of decisions, respectively. 7 Several related cat-
egories were then arranged in groups to provide a greater range of
data for comparison.' 8 Based on the outcome, three of these catego-
ries were chosen for analysis in this Note: racial discrimination, free-
dom of expression, and criminal law. 9
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND RACE
As already noted, the sum of all discrimination claims20 indicates
that the Rehnquist Court's record was virtually identical to its prede-
cessor. The data demonstrate that the Burger Court rendered deci-
sions beneficial to the minority-plaintiff 70.8% of the time as
14. The beneficiary was the party whose interests were advanced by the decision,
not necessarily an outright winner or loser. Where the decision favored both sides
equally, the beneficiary was a split.
15. The decrease in the number of full decisions has "occurred despite increasing
record numbers of case filings." Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., The Dynamics and Determi-
nants of Agenda Change in the Rehnquist Court, in Contemplating Courts, supra note
1 at 251, 267 [hereinafter Pacelle, Dynamics].
16. The Burger Court averaged just over 145 signed decisions per term, while the
Rehnquist Court averaged only 90 signed decisions per term.
17. See infra app. at tbl. 2-d.
18. These categories included federal and state law, criminal cases (composed of
habeas and criminal law decisions), civil rights (including race and nationality, gender,
age, disability, and other discrimination claims, § 1983 cases, and voting rights claims),
First Amendment decisions, and labor decisions (including NLRA and ERISA
claims).
19. Interestingly, these issues were not the anticipated focal points when this pro-
ject was begun. In fact, issues concerning federalism were expected to be the eventual
focus of this Note when the data were assembled. While the data did indicate a shift
in decisions regarding federal, state, and local regulations, as well as in cases of con-
flicts between federal and state law, the categories addressed in this Note proved un-
expectedly compelling.




compared to 68.3% of the time by the Rehnquist Court.21 But when
the decisions are divided into subcategories of age, race and national-
ity, gender, and "other" discrimination2 - claims, it becomes clear that
the Rehnquist Court was far more likely to find against a racial minor-
ity than the Burger Court, favoring the racial minority only 25% of
the time, down from 64% of the time under the Burger Court. In
contrast, the Court is equally as likely or more likely to find in favor of
the minority-plaintiff in the remaining types of claims? 3 Moreover,
the Rehnquist Court dedicated only 5.1% of its adjusted total deci-
sions to discrimination claims, a sharp decrease from the 7.1% of the
Burger Court's adjusted total cases. This change was accounted for
almost entirely by a drop in the number of race-based claims heard as
a percentage of total discrimination cases.'
A. Expectations of the Rehnquist Court
Although a complete reversal of the Burger Court's restrained civil
fights policy was generally not expected,6 many observers were ap-
prehensive, conceding that the "logical implication" of the Court's
philosophy foreshadowed significant change. 7 The conservative
views of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in particular were
said to portend "a diminished concept of rights and, even where those
rights are present, a diminished capacity to enforce them."' But as
late as 1992, the Court was described as having compiled a "mixed"
record on affirmative action. 9 Similarly, empirical studies of the early
Rehnquist Court indicated that it had been more liberal on civil liber-
ties issues than expected.30 As the Rehnquist Court's racial discrimi-
21. See infra app. at tbl. 2-a.
22. The "other" discrimination category includes claims by the disabled, homosex-
uals, institutionalized individuals, parents and children, and government entitlement
recipients, as well as prisoners' Bivens claims, and intimidation claims.
23. See infra app. at tbl. 2-b. The apparently large decrease in support for age-
based claims from 100% during the Burger Court to 66.7% during the Rehnquist
Court actually only reflects a tiny number of cases: four of four decisions for the age-
based plaintiff in the Burger Court, two of three decisions in the Rehnquist Court.
24. See infra app. at tbl. 2-a.
25. See id.; infra app. at tbl. 3-a.
26. See Pacelle, Transformation, supra note 13, at 203.
27. Id.; see also Stanley H. Friedelbaum, The Rehnquist Court: In Pursuit of Judi-
cial Conservatism 119 (1994) [hereinafter Friedelbaum, The Rehnquist Court] (stat-
ing that the return to strict scrutiny for all race-based classifications "augurs a period
of moderation, if not cessation, in the development of programs explicitly designed to
assist minorities").
28. Haywood Burns, The Activism Is Not Affirmative, in The Burger Years 95, 107
(Herman Schwartz ed., 1987).
29. Michael Comiskey, The Rehnquist Court and American Values, 77 Judicature
261, 263 (1994).
30. See Smith & Hensley, supra note 13, at 85.
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nation doctrine emerged, however, its "eroding support" for raced-
based remedies of de facto discrimination became apparent.'
And as this agenda change became evident over the last five years,
the Rehnquist Court's racial discrimination policy was called unrealis-
tic or worse:
[T]he Court was suggesting that if we pretend that race and ra-
cism don't exist, and if we just ignore race, eliminate laws that ac-
knowledge racism and attempt to correct it, and just act as if things
are the way we want them to be, someday we'll somehow evolve
into this picture-perfect color-blind society with one race-the
American race.
Give me a break.32
Other commentators have expressed similar dissatisfaction with the
Rehnquist Court's decisions, describing its assumptions about racism
as "implausible, '33 and criticizing it as "increasingly less responsive to
the interests and rights of African Americans and other minorities. '34
Unfortunately, these later criticisms appear to accurately reflect a
withdrawal of Supreme Court support for government-sponsored re-
dress of racial discrimination.
B. The Data
Race-based claims accounted for 43.9% of all Burger Court dis-
crimination claims but only 30.8% of Rehnquist Court discrimination
claims. Moreover, a compilation of prisoners' § 1983 and "other"
claims demonstrates that, at the same time that the Rehnquist Court
withdrew support from racial minorities, it increased the percentage
of decisions benefiting prisoners posing civil rights challenges. 3 6
31. See Comiskey, supra note 29, at 264; Smith & Hensley, supra note 13, at 85.
32. Angela Davis, Race, Law and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American
Dilemma, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 567, 637 (1996) [hereinafter Davis, The American
Dilemma].
33. Sameer M. Ashar & Lisa F. Opoku, Recent Developments, Justice O'Connor's
Blind Rationalization of Affirmative Action Jurisprudence-Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 223, 223-24 (1996).
34. Michael W. Combs, The Supreme Court and African Americans: Personnel
and Policy Transformations, 36 How. L.J. 139, 182 (1993).
35. See infra app. at tbl. 2-b. Viewed another way, race-based discrimination
claims dropped from 3.10% (25 cases) of the Burger Court's adjusted total decisions
to 1.57% (8 cases) of the Rehnquist Court's adjusted total decisions.
36. Decisions favorable to prisoners increased from only 14% under the Burger
Court to 67% under the Rehnquist Court. Compare Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
325-26 (1986) (holding that shooting prisoner-plaintiff during attempt to rescue prison
guard in riot did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 332-33 (1986) (denying cause of action under § 1983 for negligence);
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1986)(denying cause of action under
§ 1983 for lack of due care in injury to prisoner); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536
(1984) (holding that because prisoner has no expectation of privacy in his cell, a shake
down search did not constitute illegal search and seizure); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,
56 (1983) (allowing punitive damages against prison found culpable for sexual assault
2690 [Vol. 65
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These data seem to support the contention of Rehnquist Court critics
who claimed that "given the legal philosophy of the Rehnquist Court,
the intent doctrine and the case law ... will certainly be employed to
retreat from Brown and its symbolism." 37 Indeed, the statistics com-
piled here demonstrate a disturbing trend of shielding the majority
from any disadvantage stemming from societal attempts to compen-
sate for racial discrimination. The majoritarian agenda suggested by
this data is the effective equivalent of closing the doors of the Court to
the nation's minorities, transforming that institution into an instru-
ment of the status quo.
But in determining whether the bias against race-based claims is as
strong as the statistics indicated, it is important to consider what issues
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts addressed in the two eras. First, the
racial discrimination claims may be broken into four subcategories to
illustrate the basic issues the Courts addressed. 3s A comparison of
cases falling in the same subcategory may demonstrate the substance
on youth offender); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 345-46 (1983) (rejecting cause of
action for criminal defendant against police officer who perjured himself during trial);
and Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476-77 (1983) (holding that prison's evidentiary
review satisfied due process for prisoner confined to administrative segregation) with
Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2182-84 (1996) (holding that showing of isolated ac-
tual injury was insufficient to sustain class action on behalf of prisoners); Sandin v.
Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1995) (holding that refusal to allow witness at a disci-
plinary hearing did not violate due process); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847
(1994) (holding that prisoner-plaintiff may state a claim asserting prison liability for
deliberate indifference to inmate safety); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)
(allowing claim for involuntary exposure to second-hand cigarette smoke); Hudson v.
McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) (holding that physical force resulting in injury may
constitute a violation of inmate's rights); and McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 149
(1992) (holding that prisoner-plaintiff need not exhaust state administrative proce-
dures before filing a Bivens Action). It is also interesting to note that prisoners are
beneficiaries of favorable decisions more often than minorities in light of the current
Court's unsympathetic disposition toward the rights of criminal defendants. See infra
part IV.
37. Combs, supra note 34, at 182.
38. See infra app. at tbL 3-a. The subcategories were determined by compiling the
cases by type of discrimination alleged, and then grouping them based on the similar-
ity of the claims made. For example, the racial classification subcategory encompasses
both formal racial classifications and de facto classifications resulting from unequal
application of the law. Therefore, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097, 2117 (1995), which involved a challenge to a government affirmative action pro-
gram, was placed in the racial classification category. But a strikingly different case,
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985), was included in this category as an
instance of de facto classification because the claimant alleged discriminatory applica-
tion of a criminal statute-i.e., the law was selectively used to punish minorities.
United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996), was placed in this category for
largely the same reasons-unequal prosecution on the basis of race. The institutional
racism category is composed of discrimination claims lodged against non-governmen-
tal entities. For example, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 577, 605
(1983), concerning whether the I.R.S. could deny tax exempt status on the basis of
discriminatory admission standards, was placed in this category because the alleged
racial discrimination was committed by a private institution.
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behind the statistics. As these data indicate, the Rehnquist Court was
unsympathetic to most racial discrimination claims.
C. Discussion
Examination of both Courts' desegregation decisions alone indi-
cates that the Rehnquist Court was somewhat uncomfortable with
government intervention in such cases. When racial classification, in-
stitutional racism, and discrimination are also considered, however, a
pattern of finding against racial minorities becomes increasingly evi-
dent. Moreover, the Rehnquist Court's voting rights decisions further
support the implication that it treated racial minorities not as a class
that required the Court's guardianship but, instead, as a class wielding
inordinate political influence from which the majority had to be
protected.
1. School Desegregation
While the Burger Court's school desegregation decisions rendered
somewhat equivocal results, a comparison of the desegregation deci-
sions from both periods demonstrates the Rehnquist Court's relative
discomfort with court-ordered solutions to de facto segregation. In-
deed, although the Burger Court backed away from support of busing,
it was still unwilling to allow state residents, much less courts, to im-
pede a city's busing plans.39 In contrast, the Rehnquist Court ap-
peared unwilling to support continuation of integration efforts.4 0 As
indicated in Table 3-a,4' the Court heard two school desegregation
cases in each era and found for the minority once in each era.42
The Burger Court struggled with race-neutral classifications and
came to opposite conclusions regarding two seemingly similar state
constitutional amendments. In Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 1,43 the Court was faced with what it considered an "extraordinary
question: whether an elected local school board may use the Four-
teenth Amendment to defend its program of busing for integration
from attack by the State."4 In that instance, the city devised an ex-
tensive busing plan after a magnet program designed to draw white
students to inner-city schools failed to desegregate Seattle schools. 45
In response, Seattle citizens who disagreed with the plan developed
and pushed through a statewide constitutional initiative which effec-
39. See infra text accompanying notes 43-47.
40. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
41. See infra app. at tbl. 3-a.
42. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995); United States v. Fordice, 505
U.S. 717 (1992); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Crawford
v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
43. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
44. Idl at 459.
45. Id. at 461.
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tively outlawed all busing schemes.46 The Court held that the initia-
tive "use[d] the racial nature of an issue to define the governmental
decisionmaking structure, and thus impose[d] substantial aid unique
burdens on racial minorities."'47 The Court therefore struck Washing-
ton's amendment. On the other hand, in Crawford v. Board of Educa-
tion,4 the Court upheld a similar California constitutional amendment
prohibiting the state from ordering busing, absent a federal court's
finding that busing was required to remedy an equal protection viola-
tion.49 The Court concluded that California voters had "adopted" the
Fourteenth Amendment by allowing court-ordered or other busing if
required by the Federal Constitution, and, further, that states were
not required to furnish greater protection than provided by the U.S.
Constitution. 0 The Court further held that the California amendment
did not "embody a racial classification .... It simply forbids state
courts to order pupil school assignment or transportation in the ab-
sence of a Fourteenth Amendment violation." 51 In his concurrence,
Justice Blackmun distinguished the Seattle case from the California
case:
[T]he people of California-the same "entity" that put in place the
State Constitution, and created the enforceable obligation to deseg-
regate-have made the desegregation obligation judicially unen-
forceable. The "political process or the decisionmaking mechanism
used to address racially conscious legislation" has not been "singled
out for peculiar and disadvantageous treatment."' '
46. Id at 461-63.
47. Id at 470.
48. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
49. Id. at 529, 545.
50. See id. at 535.
51. Id at 537. The Court ultimately concluded:
Were we to hold that the mere repeal of race-related legislation is unconsti-
tutional, we would limit seriously the authority of States to deal with the
problems of our heterogeneous population. States would be committed ir-
revocably to legislation that has proved unsuccessful or even harmful in
practice. And certainly the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment would
not be advanced by an interpretation that discouraged the States from pro-
viding greater protection to racial minorities. Nor would the purposes of the
Amendment be furthered by requiring the States to maintain legislation
designed to ameliorate race relations or to protect racial minorities but
which has produced just the opposite effects.
Id. at 539.
52. Id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Washington
v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982)). But, in his dissent, Justice Mar-
shall countered:
In their generosity, California voters have allowed those seeking racial bal-
ance to petition the very school officials who have steadfastly maintained the
color line at the schoolhouse door to comply voluntarily with their continu-
ing state constitutional duty to desegregate. At the same time, the voters
have deprived minorities of the only method of redress that has proved ef-
fective-the full remedial powers of the state judiciary.
Id. at 562 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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By comparison, the two desegregation cases heard by the Rehnquist
Court did not address race-neutral classifications, but rather the ongo-
ing desegregation efforts themselves. In United States v. Fordice 3 the
Rehnquist Court returned to the more familiar ground of desegrega-
tion enforcement, here, in the Mississippi university system. The
Court outlined Mississippi's history of racially segregated post-secon-
dary education and the series of court orders attempting to enforce
desegregation.54 The Court repeatedly harkened back to Brown v.
Board of Education,5 noting that more than thirty years after that
decision, Mississippi's state-supported universities remained almost
entirely segregated.5 6 The Supreme Court remanded the case and or-
dered the district court to find that Mississippi had violated the Con-
stitution to the extent that the state had failed to dismantle its dual
system (and the Court hinted strongly throughout that the state had
indeed failed). 7 More recently, in Missouri v. Jenkins,5 the Court
faced a more difficult question: not whether racial desegregation con-
tinued but whether the court-ordered remedies in an eighteen-year
long Missouri case had exceeded that court's authority.5 9 There,
although Missouri had a similarly extensive history of resisting inte-
gration, the Court balked at allowing the district court to order the
state to increase teachers' salaries and fund remedial programs to
combat the continuing inequity in minority student performance,
holding that such orders were the equivalent of trying to solve an "in-
tradistrict" violation with an "interdistrict" solution.
The Rehnquist Court thus seemed comfortable finding discrimina-
tory intent when the issue could be related back to the days of Brown;
the majority made this direct connection numerous times in its discus-
sion in Fordice.6' But, when the issue was how to remedy ongoing
53. 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
54. Id at 722-24.
55. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 724-25. The Court noted:
By the mid-1980's... more than 99 percent of Mississippi's white students
were enrolled at University of Mississippi, Mississippi State, Southern Mis-
sissippi, Delta State, and Mississippi University for Women. The student
bodies at these universities remained predominantly white, averaging be-
tween 80 and 91 percent white students. Seventy-one percent of the State's
black students attended Jackson State, Alcorn State, and Mississippi Valley
State, where the racial composition ranged from 92 to 99 percent black.
Id.
57. Id at 743.
58. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
59. Id at 2042, 2046.
60. Id at 2053-54 ("This conclusion follows directly from Milliken II, decided one
year after Gautreaux, where we reaffirmed the bedrock principle that 'federal-court
decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at eliminating a condition that
does not violate the Constitution or does not flow from such a violation"' (quoting
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1922)).
61. Fordice, 505 U.S. at 734 ("Obviously, this midpassage justification for perpetu-
ating a policy enacted originally to discriminate against black students does not make
[Vol. 652694
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inequities, the Rehnquist Court seemed tentative, unwilling to require
state action. Moreover, not all commentators are convinced that the
Fordice decision benefited minorities. A major impact of this decision
could be to pose "a serious threat to the continued viability of state-
supported, predominantly black universities in the formerly segre-
gated states."'  This outcome is linked to the Court's "integrationist"
view that fails to distinguish between racial segregation by choice
from segregation by policy.63 This criticism aside, however, the Rehn-
quist Court's desegregation decisions demonstrate its reluctance to
use the Court's authority to redress de facto segregation.
2. Racial Classifications and Institutional Racism
A more obvious contrast between the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, however, exists in the subcategories of racial classifications
and institutional racism.' These two subcategories are considered to-
gether due to the absence of any institutional racism decisions by the
Rehnquist Court. Further, including the Burger Court's institutional
racism decisions underscores the Rehnquist Court's withdrawn sup-
port for minority claims, depicting a Court that preferred instead to
protect the majority's interest.
The Burger Court, unlike its successor, demonstrated a somewhat
limited interest in using the power of the court to provide narrow pro-
tection of minorities from de facto discrimination. For example, in
Hunter v. Underwood,65 the Burger Court held that a facially race-
neutral Alabama law disenfranchising anyone convicted of a crime of
"moral turpitude" nevertheless violated the Fourteenth Amendment
the present admissions standards any less constitutionally suspect."); id. at 739
("Brown and its progeny, however, established that the burden of proof falls on the
State, and not the aggrieved plaintiffs, to establish that it has dismantled its prior de
jure segregated system.").
62. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term: Constitutional Law, Part I, 106 Harv. L Rev.
163, 235 (1992).
63. Id. at 236. But see Ronald Kahn, The Supreme Court as a (Counter)
Majoritarian Institution: Misperceptions of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts,
1994 Det. C.L. Rev. 1, 42 (describing Fordice as an instance in which the Rehnquist
Court strengthened key equal protection principles).
64. Six Burger Court cases were placed in the racial classification category. See
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982). Four Rehnquist Court cases were placed in this category. See United
States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115
S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v.
City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
There were three institutional racism cases under the Burger Court. See Newport
News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983); Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363
(1982).
65. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
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due to its discriminatory intent and impact:66 "[B]oth... discrimina-
tion against blacks, as well as against poor whites, was a motivating
factor for the provision and [the law] certainly would not have been
adopted by the convention or ratified by the electorate in the absence
of the racially discriminatory motivation."'67 The Court went on to say
that "whether or not intentional disenfranchisement of poor whites
would qualify as a 'permissible motive' ... it is clear that where both
impermissible racial motivation and racially discriminatory impact are
demonstrated, Arlington Heights and Mt. Healthy supply the proper
analysis."'
In contrast, the Rehnquist Court rejected a request for discovery by
black criminal defendants who claimed they were subject to selective
prosecution due to their race, stating that the defendants "failed to
show that the Government declined to prosecute similarly situated
suspects of other races.",69 The Court repudiated the respondents' re-
iance on Hunter, citing the statistics demonstrating the discriminatory
effect of application of the moral turpitude law in that case.70 Yet
Justice Stevens in dissent cited statistics demonstrating that while 65%
of crack-users are white, only four percent of federal offenders con-
victed of trafficking in the drug are white,71 and lamented that "I
thought it was agreed that defendants do not need to prepare sophisti-
cated statistical studies in order to receive mere discovery. ' '72
On the whole, however, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have ad-
dressed significantly different issues. The Burger Court considered
whether racial classifications disadvantaged minorities, while the
Rehnquist Court examined whether government programs designed
to redress the effects of racial discrimination burdened the majority.
For example, the Burger Court "slam[med] the courthouse door" on
plaintiffs by denying them standing to bring their claim that the Inter-
nal Revenue Service was violating the Constitution and federal law in
failing to deny tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private
schools.73 But the Court had previously upheld that agency's author-
ity to deny tax-exempt status to discriminatory schools.74 In the latter
instance, the Court stated that "[g]iven the stress and anguish of the
history of efforts to escape from the shackles of the 'separate but
66. Id. at 232-33.
67. Id at 231.
68. Id at 232.
69. United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1483 (1996).
70. Id at 1487 (stating that, in Hunter, minorities were 1.7 times more likely to
suffer disenfranchisement under the law).
71. Id at 1493 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id at 1494 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 766-68 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
74. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983).
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equal' doctrine... it cannot be said that educational institutions that
... practice racial discrimination" should be subsidized by taxpayers.
75
Furthermore, in Plyler v. Doe,76 the Burger Court protected the
children of illegal aliens from a Texas law that denied public education
to undocumented children.77 There, the Court reasoned that "the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen
or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State,""8 and ultimately
concluded that there was no justification for a law "that impose[d] its
discriminatory burden on the basis of a legal characteristic over which
children can have little control.
79
In contrast, the Rehnquist Court focused not on whether a racial
classification unfairly burdened a minority, but rather on whether it
disadvantaged the majority. In Northeastern Florida Chapter of the
Associated General Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville,8°
the Court held that a construction guild need not show that one of its
members would have received a contract absent a local affirmative
action ordinance. 81 The Court cited Allen v. Wrights2 in its analysis of
the standing doctrine, yet came to the opposite conclusion: Where the
Burger Court had denied standing to minority plaintiffs challenging
tax practices because they could allege no specific injury, the Reln-
quist Court allowed a group representing white contractors to pro-
ceed, reasoning that "[w]hen the government erects a barrier that
makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit
than it is for members of another group, a member of the former
group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would
have obtained the benefit but for the barrier in order to establish
standing. ' 8s3 The difference between Allen and Northeastern Florida
was that, in the former case, the plaintiffs sought to force the govern-
ment to deny a benefit to discriminatory groups; in the latter case,
plaintiffs sought to force the government to discontinue a program
designed to rectify past discrimination. Similarly, in Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena,' the Rehnquist Court's decision favored the
majority group challenging a government affirmative action pro-
gram.' The Court remanded the case for application of a strict scru-
tiny test, reasoning that "strict scrutiny is the best way to ensure that
courts will consistently give racial classifications that kind of detailed
75. Id at 595 (citations omitted).
76. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
77. Id at 230.
78. Id at 215 (emphasis omitted).
79. Id at 220.
80. 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
81. Id at 658.
82. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
83. Northeast Florida, 508 U.S. at 663-64, 666.
84. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
85. Id at 2113.
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examination, both as to ends and as to means."86 Despite being
chided by the dissent, 7 the majority stated that "[c]onsistency does
recognize that any individual suffers an injury when he or she is disad-
vantaged by the government because of his or her race, whatever that
race may be. "I These two decisions expressing concern that the ma-
jority might be burdened by affirmative action 89 stand in stark relief to
the Burger Court's concern with whether racial minorities were being
disadvantaged by government action and/or inaction.
3. Employment Discrimination
While the Rehnquist Court actively constructed a racial classifica-
tion doctrine hostile to government affirmative action, it all but aban-
doned race-based employment discrimination issues. Table 3-a90
demonstrates that a reduction in the number of employment discrimi-
nation claims heard accounts for a large part of the drop-off in total
race-discrimination cases heard by the Rehnquist Court as compared
to the Burger Court.9
86. Il at 2117.
87. Il at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (admonishing the court for failing to distin-
guish between "a decision by the majority to impose a special burden on the members
of a minority race and a decision by the majority to provide a benefit to certain mem-
bers of that minority notwithstanding its incidental burden on some members of the
majority").
88. Id at 2114. While the Supreme Court had previously recognized that "the
level of scrutiny does not change merely because the challenged classification oper-
ates against a group that historically has not been subject to governmental discrimina-
tion," Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986), that principle had
been applied to redress discrimination against the plaintiff, not to assist a plaintiff
seeking to prevent government-sponsored redress of discrimination. See, e.g., Missis-
sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731-33 (1982) (holding that single-sex
admissions policy of a state supported university cannot be justified on the ground
that it compensates for discrimination against women).
89. See David M. O'Brien, Charting the Rehnquist Court's Course: How the
Center Folds, Holds, and Shifts, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 981, 986 (1996) ("A majority of
the Rehnquist Court turned the corner on affirmative action in Richmond v. J.A.
Croson, making it much more difficult for states and localities to defend such pro-
grams, and in Northeastern Florida Contractors v. Jacksonville making it easier for
white-owned businesses to attack the constitutionality of such programs." (footnotes
omitted)).
90. See infra app. at tbl. 3-a.
91. Sixteen cases were included in the employment discrimination subcategory.
See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986);
Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Wy-
gant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Burnett v. Gratton, 468 U.S. 42(1984); Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867 (1984); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co.,
466 U.S. 54 (1984); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 56 (1984);
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982); Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982); Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982); United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458
U.S. 375 (1982); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
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Although the Burger Court appeared generally sympathetic to em-
ployment discrimination claims, finding for the plaintiff in seven out
of thirteen such cases, it did not hold minority claimants to a low bur-
den of proof. For example, in General Building Contractors Associa-
tion v. Pennsylvania,9" the Court held that, to establish liability for
damages under federal law, a minority plaintiff had to show that em-
ployers and contractors who made use of a union hiring hall system
were aware of the union's discriminatory intent.93 But in Connecticut
v. Teal,' the Court found that the disparate impact of a facially neu-
tral standardized test was sufficient to establish a prima facie case
under Title VII.9S The Court focused on preventing "employment and
promotion requirements that create a discriminatory bar to opportuni-
ties," not "on the overall number of minority or female applicants ac-
tually hired or promoted." 96 Further, in Local 28 of the Sheet Metal
Workers' International Association v. EEOC,97 the Burger Court up-
held a lower court's decision which had established a 29% minority
membership goal and assessing fines against a New York union that
had ignored that court's earlier orders to integrate.98 The Court held
that Title VII
does not prohibit a court from ordering ... affirmative race-con-
scious relief as a remedy for past discrimination. Specifically, we
hold that such relief may be appropriate where an employer or a
labor union has engaged in persistent or egregious discrimination,
or where necessary to dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive
discrimination. 99
While the Burger Court held minority claimants to a high evidentiary
standard, it accepted affirmative action as a tool to redress racial
discrimination.
While the Rehnquist Court actively undercut affirmative action in
government classification cases, it did not directly address affirmative
action in its employment discrimination cases; rather, the Court con-
92. 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
93. let at 391-97. The plaintiffs had sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which the Court
traced to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in concluding that the statute was only meant to
reach intentional discrimination. ld. at 396. For additional examples of the Burger
Court's imposition of high evidentiary burdens on minority claimants, see Patterson,
456 U.S. at 77 (holding that a Title VII exemption for seniority systems applies to
systems implemented before, as well as after, the passage of Title VII); Wygant, 476
U.S. at 283-84 (holding that a layoff policy giving preference to minority employees
must be narrowly tailored).
94. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
95. Id. at 448-49.
96. Id. at 450 (emphasis omitted).
97. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
98. Id. at 443-44.
99. I. at 445.
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sidered issues of proof 0 and the retroactive application of statutory
amendments.'0 1 In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,10 2 the Court
held that the trier of fact's rejection of the employer's explanation for
the charged discrimination does not mandate a finding for the plain-
tiff, stating that regardless of the credibility of its statements, by sim-
ply proffering an explanation, the defendant had met its burden of
production. 3 Despite the unlikelihood of the employer's explana-
tion, the burden of proving discriminatory intent remained with the
plaintiff.' The dissent accused the majority of abandoning twenty
years of framework established to handle employment discrimination
claims:
[T]he Court holds that, once a Title VII plaintiff succeeds in show-
ing at trial that the defendant has come forward with pretextual rea-
sons for its actions in response to a prima facie showing of
discrimination, the factfinder still may proceed to roam the record,
searching for some nondiscriminatory explanation that the defend-
ant has not raised and that the plaintiff has had no fair opportunity
to disprove. 10 5
The majority acknowledged that not all employers would provide
truthful answers to such claims, but distinguished a dishonest answer
from proof of discriminatory intent, dismissing the assumption that
perjured testimony was proffered to hide discriminatory intent:
"[E]ven if we could readily identify these perjurers, what an extraordi-
nary notion, that we 'exempt them from responsibility for their lies'
unless we enter Title VII judgments for the plaintiffs! Title VII is not
a cause of action for perjury. 106
The Rehnquist Court even resisted congressional criticism of its dis-
crimination decisions. In Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.,107 a race-
based employment discrimination case, the Court held that an amend-
ment to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 did not retroactively apply to employers,
100. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508-12 (1993) (holding
that showing that the defendant-employer provided an untruthful explanation for its
alleged discrimination was insufficient to shift the burden of proof to the employer).
101. See, e.g., Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 313 (1994) (holding
that a Congressional amendment to employment discrimination law was not
retroactive).
102. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
103. Id. at 509-10.
104. I& at 510-11. The Court went on to say that "nothing in law would permit us
to substitute for the required finding that the employer's action was the product of
unlawful discrimination, the much different (and much lesser) finding that the em-
ployer's explanation of its action was not believable." Id. at 514-15.
105. kla at 525 (Souter, J., dissenting).
106. 1a at 521. In contrast, the Rehnquist Court eased the burden for gender-
based employment discrimination claims in Harris v. Forklift System, Inc., 510 U.S.
17, 21-23 (1993). The Court held that demonstration of a "discriminatorily abusive
work environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological
well-being" was sufficient to state a claim under Title VII. Id. at 22.
107. 511 U.S. 298 (1994).
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despite the fact that the amendment was Congress's attempt to legisla-
tively overrule a previous Supreme Court decision." The Court's re-
jection of retroactive application of the amended statute hinged on
the fact that the new law "enlarged the category of conduct that is
subject to § 1981 liability."'1 9 Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing
that the Court was "prolong[ing] the life of that congressionally repu-
diated decision." 110 This resistance to legislative rejection of the
Rehnquist Court's racial discrimination doctrine is ironic in light of
the Rehnquist Court's apparent preference for protecting the major-
ity,"' in this case apparently from itself. Moreover, the Court's aban-
donment of employment discrimination claims demonstrates its
reluctance to support government attempts to combat subtle forms of
racism.1 2
4. Voting Rights
Finally, an examination of the Rehnquist Court's voting rights deci-
sions accentuates the Court's withdrawal of support of race-based
claims. Overall, findings favorable to the party challenging voting
rights restrictions fell from 75% in the Burger Court to only 36% in
the Rehnquist Court." 3 But these figures alone do not clearly demon-
strate any animus toward racial claims for two reasons: First, this cat-
egory includes all challenges to restrictions of voting rights, including
such non-race-based issues as write-in votes and political gerryman-
dering; and, second, the challengers in some cases are whites challeng-
ing majority-minority districts."' An analysis of the Rehnquist
Court's race-based voting rights cases, however, supports the conclu-
sion that, while this Court was unsympathetic to racial discrimination
claims brought by minorities, it favored majority claims of reverse-
discrimination. 115
108. Id. at 304, 313. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), the
Court had held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 no longer applied after a contract had been
formed, effectively ending the Rivers plaintiffs § 1981 claim in the lower court. Rivers,
511 U.S. at 301-03. While the Rivers plaintiff's appeal was pending, Congress
amended § 1981, effectively overruling the Patterson decision. I at 302.
109. I& The Court relied on a similar case in which a gender-based employment
discrimination claim failed because the Court refused to retroactively apply another
amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286
(1994). Landgraf was the only decision of five regarding gender discrimination ren-
dered against the plaintiff by the Rehnquist Court. See infra app. at tbl. 2-b.
110. Rivers, 511 U.S. at 315 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
111. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term: Foreword. The Van-
ishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43, 96 (1989).
112. See Pacelle, Dynamics, supra note 15, at 265 (noting the Court's growing "will-
ingness to defer to Congress and the executive branch in civil liberties and civil rights
issues").
113. See infra app. at tbl. 2-a.
114. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
115. An interesting corollary to the apparent shift in race-based claims are the tri-
bal rights cases. Although these cases tend to focus on land disputes, tribal autonomy
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Once the race-based voting rights claims are distilled from the cate-
gory, it becomes clear that only two of ten Rehnquist Court decisions
benefited minorities. 116 In Morse v. Republican Party,"7 the plurality
held that a Virginia Republican Party plan to charge a fee to partici-
pate in its U.S. Senate nomination process violated the Voting Rights
Act." 8 But the beneficiary of the Court's decision in United States v.
Hays119 provides little evidence of any support for minority voting
rights. There, the Court denied standing to white plaintiffs challeng-
ing a majority-minority district because they did not live in the rele-
vant district' 20
In fact, six of the eight remaining Rehnquist Court decisions regard-
ing race-based voting rights claims also involve proportional represen-
tation and/or majority-minority districts. In the four cases of this
group in which the decision benefited the challenger, the plaintiff was
a member of the majority challenging a majority-minority district. 21
from state regulation, and law suit jurisdiction rather than directly addressing civil
rights issues, it is interesting to note that while the Burger Court found in favor of
tribes 61% of the time, the Rehnquist Court found for tribes only 25% of the time.
See infra app. at tbl. 2-a. This reversal in decisions favoring tribal interests is almost
exactly the same as the reversal in decisions favoring racial minorities in discrimina-
tion cases. Cf id. at tbl. 2-a and tbl. 2-b.
116. Two Rehnquist Court voting rights cases were classified as favoring minorities.
See United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995); Morse v. Republican Party of Va.,
116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996). Eight Rehnquist Court voting rights cases were decided
against minority interests. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116
S. Ct. 1894 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S.
874 (1994); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993); Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502
U.S. 491 (1992).
117. 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996).
118. d at 1191-92, 1213. Two Justices found that the fee required preclearance and
was also banned as equivalent to a poll tax. Id. at 1198-99, 1213. Three other Justices
found the tax unconstitutional under the Twenty-fourth Amendment ban on poll tax.
Id. at 1215.
119. 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).
120. Id at 2437.
121. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (holding that the plaintiff had
standing to challenge the majority-minority congressional districts in North Carolina).
The Court based its decision on the suspect nature of any racial classification, stating:
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong
to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical
and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one an-
other but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to
political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of the same
racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the
community in which the live-think alike, share the same political interests,
and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.
Id. at 647.
The Court went on to invalidate those congressional districts in Shaw v. Hunt, 116
S. Ct. 1894, 1905 (1996). Similarly, the Court upheld a challenge to Georgia's major-
ity-minority districts in Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2493-94 (1995), and held in
Bush v. Vera that Texas's minority-majority congressional must be districts subject to
strict scrutiny, stating that "to the extent that race is used as a proxy for political
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In the four cases involving minority allegations of vote and power di-
lution, the Court found for the government and against the minor-
ity.'2 Indeed, the Court's voting rights decisions have "sent tremors
through the emerging minority political establishment."'" The Rehn-
quist Court's distrust of government affirmative action programs
could lead to a chilling effect on minority influence on American poli-
tics. In combination with the Rehnquist Court's resistance to recog-
nizing subtle forms of discrimination, its lack of support for minority
voting rights claims could systematically eliminate minority voices
from the public discourse.
D. Summary
Alone, the statistics support commentators who decry a disturbing
trend toward denying government protection to minorities. As critics
have noted, the Court's "misguided" assumptions that racial discrimi-
nation is a remnant of the past and that group rights cannot be ad-
vanced over individual rights to redress centuries of discrimination
"warrant skepticism about the good faith desire of the [majority of the
Court] to promote equality of opportunity for those who have suf-
fered and continue to suffer from discrimination and oppression on
the basis of race and ethnicity."' 2  And, it is important that, at least
with regard to employment discrimination and desegregation cases,
the Rehnquist Court is hearing somewhat different issues than its
predecessor. 25 This change in focus could be interpreted as an ac-
ceptance of the Burger Court's narrow concept of civil rights.126 But,
in combination with its voting rights decisions and the shift toward
finding all racial classifications suspect, regardless of the underlying
characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is in operation." 116 S. Ct.
1941, 1956 (1996).
122. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1024 (1994) (rejecting Hispanic and
black voter challenge to Florida redistricting plan, finding insufficient evidence of
vote dilution in majority districts where minorities receive proportional representa-
tion through majority-minority voting districts); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 885
(1994) (rejecting black plaintiff's challenge to county's single-member board of com-
missioners on the basis that the number of members in the governing body is not
subject to a vote dilution claim); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 42 (1993) (holding
that the district court erred in requiring Minnesota to establish a majority-minority
district because there was insufficient evidence of vote dilution); Presley v. Etowah
County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 509-510 (1992) (holding that county commissioners'
action diluting their own power just after black resident was elected to the comnis-
sion was not actionable).
123. Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional Contours of Race and Politics, 1995
Sup. CL Rev. 45, 69.
124. Ashar & Opoku, supra note 33, at 223.
125. See supra notes 65-97 and accompanying text.
126. See Bums, supra note 28, at 106-07 ("The constricted vision of the Burger
Court where the rights of racial minorities are concerned has resulted in a narrower




reasons for those classifications, it seems evident that the Rehnquist
Court, while otherwise sympathetic to non-race-based discrimination
and civil right claims, rejected the need for protection of minorities
suffering from subtle forms of discrimination. As a plurality of the
Court explained, "Our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence evinces
a commitment to eliminate unnecessary and excessive governmental
use and reinforcement of racial stereotypes," including affirmative ac-
tion and majority-minority districts. 12 7 The Court's shift in agenda has
been described as "strikingly remindful of Plessy[v. Ferguson] [in that
t]he Court did not consider the overall impact of the decision upon
the principles of anti-discrimination and equality or the eradication of,,128 AsJuti
racism. As Justice Stevens concluded in his dissent in Adarand,2 9
the Court's rejection of all race-based classifications could
produce the anomalous result that the Government can more easily
enact affirmative-action programs to remedy discrimination against
women than it can enact affirmative-action programs to remedy dis-
crimination against African Americans-even though the primary
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to end discrimination
against the former slaves. 130
In this context, the Court's majoritarian impulses are undercutting
those Americans whose birth places them outside the majority, free-
ing the political branches to ignore racial minority interests.13 1 It
seems clear that in seeking to establish a color-blind doctrine in a na-
tion in which majority membership is defined by race, the Rehnquist
Court has all but banished the unique complaints of racial minorities
from its hallowed halls.
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND FREE SPEECH
Although the Rehnquist Court had a conservative record with re-
gard to racial discrimination claims, the statistics indicate that it em-
127. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1964 (1996).
128. Combs, supra note 34, at 177. The Rehnquist Court's affirmative action deci-
sions have also been described as obstructionist:
Just as it did more than a century ago in overseeing the demise of Recon-
struction, the Supreme Court is obstructing yet another national consensus
supporting affirmative measures to eliminate systemic discrimination from
American society. By narrow majorities, the Court has meticulously laid the
groundwork for a new and untested colorblind jurisprudence, with the ulti-
mate aim of invalidating government use of race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion as an instrument of public policy in dismantling entrenched patterns of
systemic discrimination against minorities and women.
Brent E. Simmons, Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative Action, 2 Mich. J.
Race & L. 51, 52-53 (1996).
129. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
130. Id at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. See Lynne Henderson, Note, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 Ind.
L.J. 379, 435-36 (1991) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court's majoritarian jurisprudence




braced the First Amendment right to freedom of expression. 32 While
the Burger Court upheld that right only 52% of the time, the Rehn-
quist Court did so 79% of the time.133 That the Rehnquist Court has
narrowed the protections of racial minorities while broadening the
right to freedom of speech and expression appears, at first, incongru-
ous. This apparent incongruence can be considered as such only when
the status of the Court is posed as a question of liberal or conservative
leanings. The simultaneous support of the freedom of expression and
rejection of affirmative action are consistent, however, in that they
reflect the Rehnquist Court's focus onprotecting the majority's right
to be free from government intrusion.' But regardless of its motiva-
tion, it is clear that the Rehnquist Court has provided far greater First
Amendment protection than did its predecessor.
A. Expectations and Critiques of the Rehnquist Court's First
Amendment Decisions
The Burger Court was accused of having "forgotten or ignored the
most fundamental tenet of First Amendment theory, namely, that
freedom of expression occupies a special status in our constitutional
structure."'135 A continued apathy for the freedom of expression was
likewise expected from the nascent Rehnquist Court,'3 prompting
one commentator to lament that "critics of the Burger Court may
come to look back upon its receding period with more than a little
nostalgia." 37 Others anticipated the "post-Burger era [of First
Amendment jurisprudence] with the deepest foreboding."13 There
was particular concern for the new commercial speech doctrine,
prompting predictions of "poor prospects for its survival in the Rehn-
quist Court."'1 39 These fears were founded both on the growing con-
servative composition of the early Rehnquist Court and on experience
with the Burger Court, which, at least in its waning years, often found
the freedom of expression to be "subordinate" to other important so-
cial issues."
132. See infra app. at tbl. 2-c.
133. See infra app. at tbl. 2-c.
134. See Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Its First Amendment Constituency,
44 Hastings LJ. 881, 898-99 (1993) (indicating that the Rehnquist Court's First
Amendment decisions are a logical result of its policy inclinations.
135. Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of the Press Under the Burger Court, in The
Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't 1, 26 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
136. See Lyle Denniston, The Burger Court and the Press in The Burger Years 23,
44 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987); Friedelbaum, supra note 27, at 64; William C.
Louthan, The United States Supreme Court: Lawmaking in the Third Branch of Gov-
ernment 224 (1991).
137. Schwartz, A History, supra note 1, at 375.
138. Denniston, supra note 136, at 44.
139. Friedelbaum, supra note 27, at 64.
140. See Emerson, supra note 135, at 24-26.
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The early Rehnquist Court "shocked" its conservative supporters
when it seemed to embrace the First Amendment freedom of expres-
sion. 4' Indeed, many of the Court's early First Amendment decisions
were deemed surprising or anomalous for the conservative Court. 142
As late as 1993, one judge commented that he found it "difficult to
understand the basis for the growing myth that the Court is a pro-First
Amendment institution," suggesting that any apparently favorable de-
cisions were not the norm.143 He said he found the four vote minority
dissent in positive First Amendment decisions to be ominous, an indi-
cation of reversals to come.' 44 But as the Rehnquist Court continued
to render decisions protecting the freedom of speech, other observers
began to take note. Eventually, commentators shifted their focus, at-
tempting to explain why the Rehnquist Court embraced the First
Amendment, positing that "the court [was] in the happy situation,...
in which its policy inclinations coincide[d] with an important constitu-
ency's interests.' '1 45
B. The Data
The dire predictions for First Amendment jurisprudence in the
Rehnquist Court have thus far proved dead wrong. As indicated in
Table 2-c,' 46 the Rehnquist Court "regularly upholds First Amend-
ment claims.' 1 47 The Rehnquist Court rendered 79% of its First
Amendment decisions in favor of the freedom of speech, a sharp in-
crease from the Burger Court's 52% rate of favorable decisions.148 As
with discrimination cases, the First Amendment decisions were bro-
ken down into subcategories for further comparison.' 49 An examina-
tion of these subcategories demonstrates that the Burger Court was
willing to subordinate First Amendment free expression to social con-
cerns such as controlling pornography. In fact, in every case posing a
First Amendment challenge to a government restriction of pornogra-
141. Louthan, supra note 136, at 224 ("Rehnquist shocked his conservative sup-
porters off the Court with his opinion holding that the Rev. Jerry Falwell could not
collect damages for emotional distress imposed on him by a parody in Larry Flynt's
Hustler Magazine that portrayed Falwell as an incestuous drunk.").
142. See Tushnet, supra note 134, at 891-92.
143. Stephen Reinhardt, The First Amendment: The Supreme Court and the Left-
With Friends Like These, 44 Hastings L.J. 809, 818 (1994).
144. Id
145. Tushnet, supra note 134, at 898.
146. See infra app. at tbl. 2-c.
147. Tushnet, supra note 134, at 899.
148. See infra app. at tbl. 2-c.
149. See infra app. at tbl. 3-b. The cases were placed in a subcategory based on the
type of speech restriction challenged: cable television, campaign activities, commer-
cial speech, forum, intragovernmental restrictions, press access, protest, and content.
For example, cases in which the government tried to impose restrictions on its em-
ployees or recipients of government funding were labeled intragovernmental, while
cases in which a government restriction was placed on the display of certain symbols
was placed in the content subcategory.
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phy, the Burger Court upheld the restriction. 15 On the other hand,
the Burger Court was not particularly tolerant of campaign regula-
tions or restrictions on press access to court documents.'5' In con-
trast, the Rehnquist Court increased protections against
intergovernmental restrictions, and, most dramatically, against gov-
ernment regulation by content.
In fact, despite the low expectations, the Rehnquist Court has ren-
dered decisions in favor of free expression almost across the board. In
particular, the Rehnquist Court made an apparent effort to broaden
and define the commercial speech doctrine, the area that seemed most
vulnerable to many observers. Indeed, First Amendment free expres-
sion cases occupied 5.1% percent of the Rehnquist Court's adjusted
total number of cases, a significant increase from the 3.3% of the Bur-
ger Court's adjusted total decisions. 52 Furthermore, the commercial
speech doctrine accounted for 26.9% of the Rehnquist Court's free
expression decisions, but represented only 11.1% of the Burger
Court's free expression decisions. 53 These figures indicate that the
Rehnquist Court built an active, volitional First Amendment agenda,
expanding and revising the existing doctrine.15 An examination of
the cases supports this supposition.
C. Discussion
It is difficult to understand the doom predicted for the First Amend-
ment doctrine outside the context of the Burger Court's apparent am-
bivalence toward freedom of expression. Generally, the Burger Court
permitted regulation of expression when "important" or socially fa-
vored forms of expression were not at issue.' Yet, while the data
and cases suggest that the Burger Court's freedom of expression rec-
ord was somewhat equivocal, 56 it has been suggested that, in combi-
150. See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986); City of Renton v. Play-
time Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
151. See infra app. at tbl. 3-b.
152. See infra app. at tbl. 2-c.
153. See infra app. at tbl. 3-b.
154. See Pacelle, Transformation, supra note 13, at 198-203 (discussing volitional
and exigent agendas); see also infra text accompanying notes 279-73 (indicating that
with regard to criminal justice cases, the Court appears to be constructing an exigent
agenda, maintaining rather than expanding existing doctrine).
155. See, eg., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686-87 (1986) (limit-
ing expression in a school setting); Cornelius v. NAACP Nat'l Defense & Educ. Fund,
473 U.S. 788, 808 (1985) (limiting access to a government charitable scheme); Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 226 (1982) (holding
Longshoremen liable for damages resulting from refusal to unload Russian vessel in
protest of the invasion of Afghanistan).
156. See David G. Savage, Rulings Displeased Both Left and Right: Burger Court
Leaves Unclear Legacy, L.A. Tumes, July 7, 1986, at A8 [hereinafter Savage, Legacy].
The Burger Court's First Amendment decisions
led University of Chicago law professor Geoffrey Stone to denounce the
Burger court, in a recent issue of the ABA Journal, for "selective activism."
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nation with the Warren Court, the Burger Court managed to expand
freedom of expression in important ways, including providing limited
protection to commercial speech. 57 These were the expansions many
observers feared would be curtailed. Instead, the Rehnquist Court
made the Burger Court seem tentative by comparison. The following
sections will address related subtopics of free expression decisions:
commercial speech and cable television, public and nonpublic forum,
and content.
1. Commercial Speech
The Burger Court heard three commercial speech cases and ren-
dered decisions protecting commercial speech twice. 58 As previously
noted, this area of the Burger Court's First Amendment jurisprudence
was widely applauded. And, despite commentators' worst fears, 159 the
Rehnquist Court increased the number of cases dedicated to commer-
cial speech, allowing commercial speech restrictions to stand in only
two of seven cases. 160 In one such decision, Florida Bar v. Went for It,
Inc., 61 the Rehnquist Court upheld a thirty-day ban on attorney solic-
itation of families whose loved ones had been the victims of accidents,
reasoning that other advertising options were available to attor-
neys. 62 Similarly, in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,1 63 the
Court upheld a federal government regulation preventing lottery ad-
vertisements from being broadcast in or into states in which lotteries
are illegal." 4 There, the Rehnquist Court reasoned that allowing der-
The court, while upholding a corporate right to free speech, he wrote,
"Seems unable to grasp the fact that there are groups and individuals in our
society who do not have large amounts of cash to spend on political cam-
paigns and do not have ready access to television, radio, newspapers and
other mainstream means of communication."
Id.
157. Schwartz, A History, supra note 1, at 327.
158. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206-07 (1982) (finding law restricting lawyer's
non-misleading advertising in violation of the First Amendment); Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (holding Postal Service regulation prohibit-
ing the unsolicited mailing of contraceptives ads to be in violation of the First Amend-
ment); Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 348 (1986) (holding that
Puerto Rico law prohibiting advertisement of tourist casinos to residents was nar-
rowly tailored enough to survive First Amendment challenge).
159. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
160. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996); Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585
(1994); Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994);
United States v. Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. 418 (1993); City of Cincinnati v. Discov-
ery Network, 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
161. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
162. I at 2380-81.
163. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
164. Idt at 436. The challenging broadcaster operated in Virginia where lotteries
are legal, but 7.8% percent of its audience lived in North Carolina, which prohibits
lotteries. Idt at 423-24. This decision also correlates to the Rehnquist Court's more
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ogation of the federal statute in an instance in which less than ten
percent of the station's audience resided in a non-lottery state would
be a slippery slope leading to the erosion of federal support of state
efforts to ban lotteries. 6 - Both of these cases involved targeted re-
strictions intended to protect consumers from very specific commer-
cial intrusions. In the majority of cases, however, the Rehnquist
Court has struck down state and local efforts to curb commercial
speech, holding that the First Amendment protects handbill distribu-
tion,166 advertisements describing licensed accounting skills, 67 beer
labels specifying alcohol content, 68 and advertisements containing li-
quor prices. 69
But, the Court has not clearly defined the parameters of its com-
mercial speech doctrine. For instance, in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island,170 the Court stated that "when a State entirely prohibits the
dissemination of truthful, non-misleading commercial messages for
reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process,
there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the
First Amendment generally demands.' 71 The Court concluded that
"[p]recisely because bans against truthful, non-misleading commercial
speech rarely seek to protect consumers from either deception or
overreaching, they usually rest solely on the offensive assumption that
the public will respond 'irrationally' to the truth."'" But the Rehn-
quist Court disagreed about how strictly to interpret the Burger
Court's 1980 decision in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub-
lic Service Commission. 73 Four Justices held that Central Hudson
meant that the state had the burden of showing that the commercial
sympathetic stance toward government regulation of cable television. See infra note
176 and accompanying text.
165. Edge Broadcasting, 509 U.S. at 435.
166. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1993).
167. Ibanez v. Florida Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 148-49
(1994).
168. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1594 (1995).
169. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. CL 1495, 1515 (1996).
170. 116 S. Ct. 1495 (1996).
171. Id. at 1507 (citations omitted) ("The special dangers that attend complete bans
on truthful, non-misleading commercial speech cannot be explained away by 'com-
mon-sense distinctions'. . . between commercial and non-commercial speech.").
172. Id at 1508. Although Justice Scalia seemed to agree in his dissent that most
restrictions on truthful advertisements are "paternalistic," he seemed uncomfortable
with assigning constitutional protection to commercial speech:
On the other hand, it would also be paternalism for us to prevent the people
of the States from enacting laws that we consider paternalistic, unless we
have good reason to believe that the Constitution itself forbids them. I will
take my guidance as to what the Constitution forbids, with regard to a text as
indeterminate as the First Amendment's preservation of "the freedom of
speech," and where the core offense of suppressing particular political ideas
is not at issue, from the long accepted practices of the American people.
Id. at 1515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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speech restriction would advance its interest to a "material degree," 174
while four other Justices felt that Hudson Gas required not only ad-
vancement of the state's interest, but that the restriction also be suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored to target the harm intended to be
regulated. 75 Additionally, the Rehnquist Court seemed uncertain re-
garding the related issue of regulation of cable television, rendering
split decisions in each of the two cases it heard in that area.176 This
apparent indecisiveness, when combined with the split among the Jus-
tices regarding the limits of commercial speech, have left the scope of
commercial speech protections uncertain. But such indecision ap-
pears to be a question of degree rather than an indication that the
Rehnquist Court is wavering from its unexpected commitment to up-
holding and expanding-rather than undermining-commercial
speech.
2. Public and Nonpublic Forum Questions
The issue of restrictions of expression in public and nonpublic fora
resulted in exactly the same number of cases and decisions favoring
free expression in both the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. 177 Nonpub-
lic forum cases are somewhat unique in that they often involve a con-
flict between two party's First Amendment rights: a group that wants
to spread its message through a nonpublic forum and a group that
claims it cannot be forced to disseminate a message with which it dis-
agrees. For example, the Burger Court allowed the exclusion of the
NAACP from the federal government's Combined Federal Campaign
fund-raising scheme on the basis that the program was run by a pri-
174. 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1509.
175. lit at 1521. These Justices further stated that the State's regulation must rep-
resent a cost-benefit analysis that weighs the gains of such restrictions against the
burden on free speech. Id
176. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Denver Area Educ.
Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996). For example, in Tur-
ner, the Court remanded a case challenging the federal government's content-neutral
regulation requiring cable companies to carry local stations, with instructions that
such a restriction be subjected to intermediate rather than strict First Amendment
scrutiny, but went on to say that the regulations could be sustained only if the govern-
ment demonstrated that it was protecting an important interest. Turner, 512 U.S. at
664 (requiring that the government show that "the recited harms are real.., and that
the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way").
177. Two decisions were classified as public forum cases. See Forsyth County v.
Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (holding that a county could not charge a
variable, discretionary public grounds use fee based on the content of the message of
the applying organization); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (finding a law
prohibiting the display of signs, banners, or other symbols around the Supreme Court
building to be unconstitutional). Four decisions were classified as nonpublic forum
cases. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338
(1995); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672
(1992); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
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vate entity which could control access to the program. 178 But in Pa-
cific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,179 the Burger
Court ruled that the private entity's right to freedom of expression
was violated by a California statute requiring that it include an envi-
ronmental newsletter with power bills.' °
Similarly, Rehnquist Court decisions, categorized here as prohibit-
ing a restriction on free speech, also allowed the exclusion of one type
of speech in the nonpublic forum. In doing so, the Rehnquist Court
reasoned that forcing the dissemination of messages in a nonpublic
forum was a violation of the private group's First Amendment rights.
For instance, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group,'8 ' the Court held that a homosexual organization could be ex-
cluded from the Boston St. Patrick's Day Parade because the parade
organizer was a private entity whose right to free speech was violated
by an injunction requiring it to allow the gay group to take part in the
parade.'8 The Court reasoned that "[w]hile the law is free to pro-
mote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an ap-
proved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlight-
ened either purpose may strike the government."1s In International
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,'" the Court used a re-
lated theory to allow the operators of New York area airports to for-
bid repetitive solicitation of money in its airport terminals, holding
that the plaintiff's First Amendment rights were not violated because
a private entity could reasonably restrict speech on its nonpublic
property. 185
Although questions of forum comprise a small percentage of both
Courts' total First Amendment decisions, it is in this area that the
Rehnquist Court's apparent support for the freedom of expression
may be most easily called into question. Indeed, while the First
Amendment rights of nonpublic entities are being protected in these
cases, it is at the cost of preventing the distribution of another, fre-
quently minority group's message. And it is significant that in the
nonpublic forum cases, the organizations the Rehnquist Court pro-
tected from forced dissemination of unwanted messages were an air-
port and a city parade organization, both of which operated with
significant support of the government. In allowing suppression of
nonmainstream speech in these near-public fora cases, the Rehnquist
Court carved an exception to its otherwise stringent First Amendment
178. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 868.
179. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
180. Id. at 20-21.
181. 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
182. Id. at 2343.
183. Id. at 2350.
184. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
185. See id. at 674-77, 685.
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doctrine. This small group of cases indicates that the Rehnquist
Court's support of First Amendment rights is a result of the conflu-
ence of policy inclination and an interest in protecting majority
interests. 18 6
3. Content
Restrictions of noncommercial expression on the basis of content
represent a positive reversal of fortune for freedom of expression
under the Rehnquist Court: Where the Burger Court allowed such
restrictions 85.7% of the time, the Rehnquist Court permitted such
restrictions only 16.7% of the time.187 In the only instance in which
the Burger Court struck such a restriction, it prevented a local school
board from removing books it deemed "objectionable" from public
school libraries.188 In keeping with its tendency to uphold restrictions
of relatively unimportant forms of expression, however, the Burger
Court allowed a school to punish a student for use of prohibited lan-
guage at a school assembly, 8 9 and permitted local governments to use
zoning ordinances to restrict both pornographic business' 90 and the
placement of signs on public property.' 9'
In contrast, the Rehnquist Court has not been receptive to state or
local restrictions of the freedom on expression based on content.'92 In
186. See supra text accompanying note 145.
187. See infra app. at tbl. 3-b. Six Burger Court cases were placed in the content
subcategory. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Arcara v.
Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41 (1986); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); Board of
Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Seven
Rehnquist Court cases were placed in this subcategory. See Capitol Square Review &
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43
(1994); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993);
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993); Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
188. Pico, 457 U.S. at 856, 882.
189. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 686. The Court noted that the student was in-
formed in advance by teachers that he should not deliver his inappropriate, sexually
graphic speech. Id. at 678.
190. See Arcara, 478 U.S. at 707 (holding that the First Amendment does not pro-
hibit closing of pornographic book store on suspicion of prostitution); Playtime Thea-
tres, 475 U.S. at 54 (finding ordinance limiting location of adult theaters did not
contravene the First Amendment); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 (holding that child pornog-
raphy does not enjoy First Amendment protection).
191. See Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 817 (upholding city ordinance restricting
placement of signs on public property).
192. This change of policy also explains a related reversal in Court decisions: While
the Burger Court rendered decisions favoring local regulations 64% of the time, the
Rehnquist Court has done so only 10% of the time, due in large part to its deference
to freedom of expression. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S.
123, 137 (1992) (striking a city ordinance which allowed the government to vary use
fees for parade grounds based on the projected cost of maintaining public order in
light of the content of the demonstration).
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comparison to the Burger Court's refusal to protect pornography from
government restriction, the Rehnquist Court evinced a willingness to
safeguard some pornographic television broadcasts, although that de-
cision was in the context of cable regulation.193 The Rehnquist Court,
however, protected other forms of expression that the Burger Court
was likely to have considered similarly unimportant, including hate
speech.
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,194 the Rehnquist Court struck a local
crime ordinance that prohibited the display of symbols-such as a
burning cross in a black family's yard in this instance-which a person
knew would arouse "anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion or gender."'19 The Court found that the
ordinance was a preemptively invalid content-based proscription, and
provided examples to distinguish how the government may or may not
restrict speech:
A State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the
most patently offensive in its prurience-e., that which involves the
most lascivious displays of sexual activity. But it may not prohibit,
for example, only that obscenity which includes offensive political
messages.... [A] State may choose to regulate price advertising in
one industry but not in others, because the risk of fraud ... is in its
view greater there. But a State may not prohibit only that commer-
cial advertising that depicts men in a demeaning fashion ...
[S]exually, derogatory "fighting words," among other words, may
produce a violation of Title VII[ ].... Where the government does
not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not
shielded from regulation merely because they express a discrimina-
tory idea or philosophy.196
Under this construction, the Court ruled that the local ordinance
amounted to viewpoint discrimination, and that the First Amendment
193. See Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct.
2374 (1996). There, the Court held that a portion of a regulation giving local cable
operators the choice to prohibit leasing channels for use for broadcasting sexually
explicit materials in order to protect children was constitutional as an important gov-
ernment interest, but that two other provisions of the law, requiring (1) that cable
operators segregate and block off sexually explicit leased channels, providing those
channels only to consumers who contacted the cable company and requested the
channels, and (2) that they prohibit patently offensive programming on public access
stations, were in violation of the First Amendment. Id. at 2381-82,2394-97. The Court
reasoned that the part of the law allowing cable companies to choose whether or not
to restrict leased channels was constitutional because it was permissive, but that regu-
lations requiring segregation and blocking of explicit channels and prohibition of sex-
ually explicit programs on public access would "greatly increase the risk that certain
categories of programming (say, borderline offensive programs) [would] not appear."
Id at 2397.
194. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
195. Id. at 380 (citations omitted).
196. Id. at 388-90 (citations omitted).
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did not "permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects."'"
Similarly, in Dawson v. Delaware,19 the Court held that presenting
evidence of a convicted murderer's tattoo of the symbol for and mem-
bership in the Aryan Brotherhood was a violation of his right to free
expression because that membership was unrelated to the crime
charged. 199 But in the Court's only decision upholding a government
regulation based on the content of expression, Wisconsin v. Mitch-
ell,"o' it allowed an upward departure in sentencing for a black man
convicted of inciting and participating in an attack on a white youth
because the victim was chosen on the basis of his race °.2 0 The defense
argued that a law providing for an enhanced sentence for racially-mo-
tivated crimes violated the First Amendment by punishing the offend-
ers' bigoted beliefs.202 The Court responded that R.A.V. did not
support the defendant, however, because assault, unlike cross-burn-
ing, is not a protected form of expression.20 3 Moreover, the Court
defended the race-motivation sentence enhancement law on the basis
that the "State's desire to redress these perceived harms [the likeli-
hood of retaliatory crimes and emotional harms associated with hate
crime] provides an adequate explanation for its penalty-enhancement
provision over and above mere disagreement with offenders' beliefs
or biases."" ° These cases demonstrate the breadth of the Rehnquist
Court's protection of the content of speech, providing latitude to par-
ties asserting First Amendment freedom of expression until their ideas
are expressed through physical violence against another person.
The boundaries of doctrine were even more clearly demonstrated in
an abortion protest case, Madsen v. Women's Health Center.2 0 5 There,
the Court upheld a court-ordered thirty-six foot protection zone
around women's health clinics 20 6 which was designed to stop abortion
opponents from preventing patient access to those clinics, but found a
second, 300 foot injunction to be in violation of the protester's right to
197. Ide at 391. The Court, however, was apparently concerned with being accused
of condoning a racist action: "Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a
cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its
disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire."
Id. at 396; see also Schwartz, A History, supra note 1, at 375 (explaining the R.A. V.
decision as a result of the theory that "conservative thought encompasses a libertarian
strain").
198. 503 U.S. 159 (1992).
199. I. at 165.
200. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
201. Id. at 479. The assailant had been watching the film "Mississippi Burning" and
apparently emerged so enraged that he engaged in the attack. Id. at 479-80.
202. Id. at 483-84.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 488.
205. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
206. The zone was approved except as to areas in which it encompassed private
property which did not have to be crossed to reach the clinic. Id. at 771.
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free expression.2 °7 Moreover, the Rehnquist Court has applied this
doctrine to disallow a number of other government restrictions, in-
cluding striking New York's "Son-of-Sam" law preventing a criminal
from profiting from his story;"' disallowing a local ordinance limiting
the types of signs that could be erected in residential areas; 0 9 finding
a First Amendment violation in denying use of school facilities to a
group on the basis of the religious content of their presentation;"'0 and
disallowing a local government rejection of a KKK request to display
a cross on public grounds.211
These decisions represent the magnitude of the Rehnquist Court's
commitment to free expression and demonstrate the broad scope of
the protections it extended to the content of such expression. The
same decisions, however, also demonstrate a limit to those protections
when the expression is not representative of the majority.
D. Summary
As this section demonstrates, the Rehnquist Court defied expecta-
tions in amassing an active First Amendment agenda and expanding
the scope of protection of free expression.212 By comparison, the Bur-
ger Court appears tentative. While the totality of the Rehnquist
Court's First Amendment decisions indicate strong support for the
right to freedom of expression, it should be noted that, when the
Court does uphold restrictions on speech, the groups that tend to be
on the losing end are not members of the mainstream majority, in-
cluding Har Krishnas in Krishna Consciousness and homosexuals in
Hurley. Furthermore, the Court protected Ku Klux Klan ("KKK")
207. Id at 774. ("Absent evidence that the protesters' speech is independently
proscribable ... or is so infused with violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat
of physical harm... this provision cannot stand.")
208. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 123 (1991).
209. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58-59 (1994).
210. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-95
(1993).
211. Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2446,2450
(1995).
212. It should be noted, however, that a strong correlation exists between the
Rehnquist Court's sympathetic freedom of speech decisions and a similar increase in
the number of First Amendment Establishment Clause decisions favoring religious
expression. The Burger Court found in favor of religious expression (or, in other
words, found no excessive entanglement between church and state) in only 42% of its
Establishment Clause cases, while the Rehnquist Court rendered decisions benefiting
religious expression 71% of the time. See infra app. at tbl. 2-c. Three of the Rehnquist
Court's freedom of speech decisions intersected with the Establishment Clause, and
in each case, the Court upheld the right to free expression while finding no impermis-
sible involvement between church and state. See Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2447; Rosenber-
ger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2524-25 (1995); Lambs
Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394-95. Here, as in its discrimination cases, the Rehnquist Court




cross burning intended to intimidate a black family in R.A. V.,213 KKK
requests to erect a cross on public grounds for Christmas in Pinette,1 4
and membership in the Aryan Brotherhood unconnected to a capital
murder in Dawson,2 15 but allowed heightened sentencing in the case
of an African American offender who chose his victim on the basis of
race.21 6 One observer claimed the distinctions between R.A. V. and
Mitchell were so slight that the opposite decisions led to a disturbing
conclusion: "The hate speech cases provide yet another basis for sus-
pecting that the Court was engaged in intentional discrimination when
it issued its racially correlated pattern of standing decisions. 2 1 7 But
other motives have been suggested, including one more closely related
to the Court's goal of upholding criminal adjudications.21s Whatever
the Rehnquist Court's motives in its First Amendment jurisprudence,
while the overall picture for freedom of speech appears relatively
healthy, if unsettled as to the ultimate scope, even in this area the
prospects for minorities before the Court remains bleak.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT AND CRIMINAL LAW
Criminal law and habeas corpus decisions combine to account for
about one-fifth of the adjusted total decisions for both the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts.21 9 Here, as with the freedom of expression cases,
the Rehnquist Court appeared somewhat more liberal than was the
Burger Court in rendering decisions favoring criminal defendants.
But defining how liberal the Rehnquist Court's decisions are as com-
pared to the Burger Court may be deceiving. Most commentators
have described the Burger Court's criminal law decisions as an about-
face from the permissive Warren Court, shifting focus from individual
rights to accurate adjudication.22 ° Moreover, the Rehnquist Court
dedicated 35.7% of its decisions to questions of capital and noncapital
sentencing-an increase from 13.1% under the Burger Court22 1 -in-
213. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
214. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. at 2446, 2450.
215. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 165 (1992).
216. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1993).
217. Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded Standing, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1422, 1484
(1995).
218. See William J. Burnett, Wisconsin v. Mitchell: First Amendment Fast-Food
Style, 4 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 385, 386-89 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme
Court had sacrificed the First Amendment in order to address hate crime).
219. See infra app. at tbl. 2-d.
220. See Yale L. Rosenberg, The Federal Habeas Corpus Custody Decisions: Lib-
eral Oasis or Conservative Prop?, 23 Am. J. Crim. L. 99, 100-01 (1995) ("Where once
the emphasis was on vindicating individual constitutional rights, [under the Rehnquist
and Burger Courts] it is on federalism, finality, factual innocence, and negotiation of a
dazzling and dizzying array of technical hoops."); Tom Stacy, The Search for Truth in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1369, 1372 (1991) ("The theme
of accurate adjudication lies at the very heart of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts'
vision of constitutional criminal procedure.").
221. See infra app. at tbl. 3-d.
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dicating that the Rehnquist Court is content to defer to Burger Court
precedents, continuing that Court's emphasis on regulating the guilty.
This trend is also consistent with the Rehnquist Court's focus on pro-
tecting the interests of the majority, favoring accurate adjudication
over individual criminal rights.
A. Expectations and Critiques of the Rehnquist Court's Criminal
Justice Decisions
It seemed at times that the Burger Court "mounted the expected
attack on the Warren Court's criminal procedure cases," particularly
with regard to search and seizure.' Strangely, however, the Burger
Court was most sympathetic to criminal defendants, deciding 71.4% of
its cases in their favor,z 3 when questions were posed regarding arrest,
an issue closely tied to search and seizure.' But, on the whole, the
Burger Court was simply unsympathetic to criminal defendants, grant-
ing defendants' habeas petitions slightly less frequently than it decided
in favor of the defendant in criminal claims, generally 25%?22 Chief
Justice Burger himself declared that the multiple trial and appeal
cases allowed the accused to continue "his warfare with society. ''226
He identified "two basic purposes of any system of justice: to protect
society, and to identify and try to correct the wrongdoer." 2 7 One
commentator proclaimed that the Burger Court's criminal law deci-
sions "impaired what may be the most important goal of American
criminal justice, protection of the innocent."'' 8 But those criminal law
222. Yale Kamisar, The "Police Practice" Phases of the Criminal Process and the
Three Phases of the Burger Court, in The Burger Years 143, 144-45 (Herman Schwartz
ed., 1987) ("[P]erhaps because the Court had become convinced that more law-en-
forcement tools were needed to combat drug traffic, during the 1982-83 term the gov-
ernment gained complete or partial victory in all nine search-and-seizure cases
decided that term (all involving drugs).").
223. See infra app. at tbl. 3-c.
224. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754-55 (1984) (holding that warrantless
night-time entry into home to arrest man suspected of a nonjailable offense was pro-
hibited); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562 (1982) (retroactively applying
previous Court decision prohibiting warrantless, nonconsensual arrest in suspect's
home to declare arrest illegal); see also Schwartz, A History, supra note 1, at 329("[T]he anticipated reversals of the key Warren Court precedents did not materialize.
Instead, the essentials of the Warren jurisprudential edifice were preserved.... [But
t]o be sure, they were modified, even narrowed and blunted in some ways."). But see
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,232 (1985) (finding sufficient reasonable suspi-
cion in memory of another department's wanted flyer to support stop to check identi-
fication and ensuing arrest).
225. See infra app. at tbl. 2-d; see also Pacelle, Dynamics, supra note 15, at 262-63("In other areas, such as criminal procedure, the Burger Court was significantly more
conservative than its predecessor.").
226. Warren E. Burger, For Whom the Bell Tolls, Remarks to the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York (Feb. 17, 1970), in Delivery of Justice 314, 315 (1990).
227. Id at 316.
228. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure
in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 Geo. L.J. 151, 155 (1980).
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decisions have also been characterized as an attempt to uphold accu-
rate convictions, in other words, to prevent the release of guilty par-
ties on the basis of technicalities.229 In either event, most observers
agree that criminal law was one area in which the Burger Court did
indeed retreat from the decisions of the Warren Court,230 regularly
"vot[ing] against the rights of accused criminals and in favor of police
and prosecutors."'' 1 One commentator summed up the legacy of the
Burger Court's crime control ideology as including
judicial deregulation of state and federal criminal justice officials,
hostility to fair process norms that impair the state's capacity to de-
tect and punish the factually guilty, and a pronounced tendency to
view individual rights from a utilitarian perspective that defines
their content in light of their functional impact on the system's ca-
pacity to promote social control.3 2
The end of the Burger Court era prompted suggestions that the
Rehnquist Court would be worse for criminal defendants than its
predecessor.233 Such critics claimed that the Rehnquist Court was
continuing to "undo" the criminal rights forged by the Warren Court,
and that "the 1990-1991 term of the Supreme Court revealed a more
decided anti-defendant animus than any that had manifested itself
during the Burger years. ' 234 The number of criminal law challenges
brought by the government was also pointed to as an example of the
prosecutorial preference of the early Rehnquist Court: "Where the
Warren Court gave a second chance to convicted criminals, the Rehn-
quist Court gave prosecutors a second chance to affirm convic-
229. See Edward Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual, and the Criminal Pro-
cess: Directions and Misdirections, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 518, 590 (1977).
230. See Rosenberg, supra note 220, at 99-100 (noting that both the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts were "less than kind to Warren Court criminal procedure prece-
dents"); Savage, Legacy, supra note 156, at 8 ("The Burger court [sic] undermined the
rights of the accused."). But see Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So
Defense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?) and Po-
lice Investigatory Practices, in The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution That
Wasn't 62, 62-63, 90-91 (V'mcent Blasi ed., 1983) (suggesting that the distinctions be-
tween the Warren and Burger Courts were based more on fear of what might happen
than on the more moderate changes the Burger Court actually made).
231. Savage, Legacy, supra note 156, at 8.
232. Peter Arenella, Foreword: Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure:
The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo. U. 185, 247 (1983).
233. See Savage, Turning Right, supra note 1, at 317-18 ("When prosecutors lost a
case in the lower courts, the Rehnquist Court could be counted on to hear the ap-
peal."); Friedelbaum, The Rehnquist Court, supra note 27, at 129 (describing the
Rehnquist Court as eager to erode the value of Warren Court criminal justice
precedents).
234. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Judicial Federalism: Current Trends and Long-Term
Prospects, 19 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1053, 1076 (1992) [hereinafter Friedelbaum, Federal-
ism]; see Pacelle, Transformation, supra note 13, at 193 (suggesting of the Rehnquist




tions."2 5 At the very least, the criminal law doctrines of both the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts seemed indistinguishable.3 Like its
predecessor, the Relnquist Court was accused of continuing to
marginalize important rights by narrowing them. 37 For example,
while it was the Burger Court that "halted and in some cases effec-
tively reversed the expansion of the rights of the accused[, t]he Rehn-
quist Court has continued this trend."'
These latter critiques appear to be somewhat more accurate. De-
spite assertions that during the 1989 and 1990 terms the Rehnquist
Court was particularly unsympathetic to criminal defendants,2 9 the
Rehnquist Court apparently entered a period of transition in the
1990s in which its criminal law decisions have comparatively moder-
ated.2 ° In combination with the understanding of the Burger Court
as a conservative criminal law Court, however, the early Rehnquist
Court's actively conservative criminal law jurisprudence 4' indicates
that the slightly higher percent of decisions favoring the defendant
from 1991-1995 did not represent a liberal criminal law trend, but in-
stead reflects the Rehnquist Court's efforts to refine its established
conservative criminal justice doctrine. This apparent shift from ex-
panding conservative criminal justice doctrine to defining its bounda-
ries may have been obviated by the increasingly conservative lower
courts, and solidified by the appointment of Justice Ginsburg, who
joined a moderate bloc including Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, which resists overturning Warren Court criminal justice prece-
dents.242 Despite these changes, however, the Rehnquist Court re-
235. Savage, Turning Right, supra note 1, at 318.
236. See Louthan, supra note 136, at 222 (noting that the early Rehnquist Court
was not "dramatically different" from the Burger Court, remaining conservative in
the area of criminal justice); Stacy, supra note 220, at 1370-73 (analyzing the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts' criminal justice decisions as a single, continuous
jurisprudence).
237. O'Brien, supra note 89, at 995-97.
238. Pacelle, Transformation, supra note 13, at 200.
239. Louthan, supra note 136, at 230-31.
240. See id at 231 ("The Supreme Court of the 1990s is a Court in transition.");
Pacelle, Dynamics, supra note 15, at 272-73 (suggesting that the conservative bloc of
the Court would have to moderate its views to woo the emerging moderate bloc).
The decisions of the late eighties have been described as decidedly pro-prosecution:
A solid conservative majority... has given constitutional endorsement to
more aggressive police work against criminal suspects .... In limited cases
... sanctioned admission into evidence of coerced confessions and ... sys-
tematically blocked off the federal courts from most constitutional claims of
convicted criminals in state prisons.
James Simon, The Center Holds: The Power Struggle Inside the Rehnquist Court 172
(1994).
241. See Friedelbaum-, The Rehnquist Court, supra note 27, at 129 (describing the
1990 term as reflecting a conservative "activist impetus" calculated to undermine
Warren Court criminal law precedents).
242. See Schwartz, A History, supra note 1, at 375.
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mained committed to protecting the majority's interest in law and
order at the expense of criminal rights.
B. The Data
As with the civil rights cases, a division of the criminal law cases
into subcategories illuminates the different issues pursued by the
Rehnquist and Burger Courts.243 A decision considered equally
favorable to both sides was awarded .5 for each side. As indicated in
Table 3-c, while a major focus of the Burger Court was search and
seizure questions, accounting for 21.7% of its total criminal law deci-
sions, the Rehnquist Court dedicated a similar share of its criminal
decisions, 21.4%, to noncapital sentencing questions. In both in-
stances, the focus on these issues corresponded with a disposition to
find against the criminal defendant, particularly when compared with
the small number of decisions in that subcategory during the other
era.
244
A striking difference between the two eras is the Rehnquist Court's
sharp reduction of cases based on such issues as Fifth Amendment
rights and search and seizure. For example, while the Burger Court
dedicated 4.3% of its criminal law decisions to questions of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Rehnquist Court
decided no criminal cases on this basis.245 Moreover, the Rehnquist
Court dedicated only 5.7% of its total criminal law decisions to ques-
tions of search and seizure, the issue that dominated the Burger
Court's criminal law decisions.246 These differences may be better un-
derstood when the above subgroups are classified into three related
subjects: sentencing cases, including capital and noncapital sentenc-
ing; substantive cases, including arrest, confrontation clause, double
jeopardy, fair trial, fifth amendment, Miranda rights, right to counsel,
search and seizure, and speedy trial; and rules and interpretation
cases, composed of definition, disclosure, hearsay, indictment, jury in-
struction, miscellaneous, and proof.247
243. See infra app. at tbl. 3-c. The cases were placed in subcategories based on the
major challenge brought by the criminal defendant. The miscellaneous subcategory
includes more technical questions such as joinder and evidentiary questions where
such issues accounted for two or fewer cases in both eras. For a list of cases organized
by subcategory, see infra app. at tbl. 1-d.
244. See infra app. at tbl. 3-c. In sentencing cases, the Rehnquist Court found for
the defendant only 16.7% of the time, versus the Burger Court who found for the
defendant 37.5% of the time. In search and seizure cases, the Burger Court found for
defendant only six percent of the time, versus the Rehnquist Court who found for the
defendant 37.5% of the time.
245. See infra app. at tbl. 3-c.
246. See infra app. at tbl. 3-c.




An examination of the Court's decisions when classified as sentenc-
ing, substantive, or rules and interpretation cases reveals that while
the Rehnquist Court was hearing fewer substantive criminal cases, it
was more moderate than the Burger Court in those instances. Once a
defendant was convicted and sentenced, however, the Rehnquist
Court had little sympathy for that defendant's legal challenge. Finally,
this grouping also suggests that, as some observers have noted, the
Rehnquist Court focused on resolving the narrow, technical issues
concentrated in the sentencing and rules and interpretation groups,
rather than rendering sweeping, substantive decisions.2 14 But, when
comparing the criminal procedure philosophies of different Courts,
"[t]he issue is not simply which side wins more frequently but whether
any distinctive pattern emerges as to how the two Courts view the
functions served by American criminal procedure. 249
1. Sentencing Cases
The Rehnquist Court's focus on sentencing and rules and interpre-
tation issues appears to indicate a Court defining the boundaries of its
criminal justice doctrine.35 0 But the sharp increase in noncapital sen-
tencing cases probably resulted from the implementation of new fed-
eral sentencing guidelines for which there was no existing
jurisprudence. Even these decisions, however, generally centered on
narrow, technical questions rather than broader issues of the constitu-
tionality of the sentencing scheme. Moreover, these decisions almost
always ended in the highest available sentence, keeping the majority
protected from convicted criminals for as long as possible. For exam-
ple, the Rehnquist Court ruled that a sentencing court had to take into
account the weight of blotter paper used to distribute LSD as defined
in the relevant criminal statute rather than use the lesser weight re-
quirement prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines; s' held that a
convicted criminal could receive an enhanced sentence for multiple
convictions reached in a single proceeding;1- held that trading a fire-
arm for drugs constituted use of a weapon for purposes of sentenc-
248. See infra app. at tbl. 3-d. As a percent of all criminal law cases, rules and
interpretation issues accounted for 42.9% of the Rehnquist Court decisions, but only
30.4% of Burger Court decisions. See infra app. at tbl. 3-d; see also Simon, supra note
240, at 303 ("[T]he Rehnquist Court has heard progressively fewer cases, and in many
of their recent decisions the language of the Court majorities has tended to be more
technical and less sweeping than in the past.").
249. Id. at 195.
250. For a list of cases by category, see infra app. at tbl. 1-d.
251. Neal v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 763, 769 (1996).
252. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 137 (1993).
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ing 253 and held that the Attorney General had authority to compute
credit toward a criminal's sentence. 4
But while the Rehnquist Court rendered decisions favoring the
criminal defendant in noncapital sentencing cases only 16.7% of the
time,2 5 it favored the defendant in 50.0% of its capital sentencing
cases.256 Not coincidentally, decisions favoring death row inmates
were unlikely to result in the release of a convicted criminal, thus re-
lieving the Rehnquist Court of its need to protect society. Moreover,
this increase in decisions favoring the defendant coincided with an in-
crease of decisions made on constitutional rather than technical
grounds. For instance, one of its capital sentencing decisions favoring
the defendant, Dawson v. Delaware,257 intersected with the First
Amendment freedom of speech.258 In that case, the Court held that
the introduction of the defendant's membership in the Aryan Broth-
ers at his sentencing violated the First Amendment.259 The majority
opinion seemed to suggest that the lower court could determine
whether the admission of the information, though violative of the First
Amendment, was nonetheless harmless error.260 But Justice Black-
mun wrote his concurrence specifically to inform the lower court that
such a determination was not required, and that the First Amend-
ment, unlike constitutionally guaranteed criminal rights, should not be
subject to harmless error review.261 This distinction between criminal
and free speech rights demonstrates the Rehnquist Court's primary
concern with protecting the majority's constitutional rights from gov-
ernment intrusion, while simultaneously sacrificing criminal constitu-
tional rights to the majority's interest in law and order.
On the other hand, another capital punishment decision favoring
the defendant, Morgan v. Illinois,262 was heard largely to end the
253. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 225-27 (1993).
254. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334-35 (1992).
255. See infra app. at tbl. 3-c. As indicated, the Rehnquist Court rendered a judg-
ment fully favoring the defendant in only two of fifteen decisions. See Rutledge v.
United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241, 1250-51 (1996) (holding that sentence amounted to an
improper, cumulative punishment for the same crime); Stinson v. United States, 508
U.S. 36, 47-48 (1993) (holding that the Sentencing Commission commentary is bind-
ing in some instances, in this case excluding the defendant's act from its definition of a
"crime of violence"). In Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996), the Court
reversed in part the lower court's decision overruling downward departure for Stacy
Koon, the officer convicted in the beating of Rodney King. ld at 2054.
256. See infra app. at tbl. 3-c. But see Friedelbaum, The Rehnquist Court, supra
note 27, at 141 ("Apart from capital punishment sentencing cases, the future of de-
fendant rights appears to be bleak but not necessarily as disheartening...
257. 503 U.S. 159 (1992).
258. Id at 160. For a full discussion of the First Amendment aspects of this case,
see supra text accompanying notes 198-98.
259. Ide at 167.
260. Id at 168-69.
261. Id at 169 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (indicating that harmless error review
would have a "potential chilling effect" on the freedom of speech).
262. 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
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"considerable disagreement among courts of last resort" as to whether
a trial court could refuse a request for inquiry into whether a juror
would automatically impose the death penalty upon conviction. 63
Over strenuous objections from dissent, the Court held that courts
could not reject such a request, and that if even "one such juror is
empaneled and the death sentence is imposed, the State is disentitled
to execute the sentence." 264 Similarly, in Simmons v. South Caro-
lina,21 5 the Court found a due process violation where a trial judge
refused to instruct the jury that a life sentence would be without pa-
role. 66 The Rehnquist Court also held that both reweighing a miti-
gating factor at sentencing,' 7 and forcing a defendant to prove his
incompetence by clear and convincing evidence' 68 violated constitu-
tionally protected rights. 69 But, as previously noted, these decisions
did not affect the criminal defendant's conviction, only his sentence.
When a decision favoring the defendant would have meant a shorter
sentence or an overturned conviction, the Rehnquist Court was far
less likely to render such a decision.7 0
2. Rules and Interpretation Cases
Like the noncapital sentencing decisions, the rules and interpreta-
tion cases resulted in few decisions for the defendant (28.3 %).7 The
Rehnquist Court used these types of cases to delimit specific issues.
For example, in two of its four jury instruction cases, 2 the Court at-
tempted to define a constitutionally acceptable reasonable doubt in-
struction, allowing each of the instructions before it.273 The Court
also required that the question of materiality be submitted to the
jury,274 but held that a jury need not be instructed of the civil commit-
ment consequences of a "not guilty only by reason of insanity" ver-
dict.275 And decisions favoring the defendant did not always result in
an overturned conviction. For example, the Rehnquist Court heard
Bailey v. United States276 to resolve a circuit conflict, holding that pos-
263. 1 at 725-26.
264. Id at 729. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's
dissent, arguing that there should be no restriction against empanelling a juror who
would automatically vote for the death penalty on conviction. 1d at 740.43.
265. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
266. Id at 156.
267. Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 529 (1992).
268. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1384 (1996).
269. Id. at 1384; Sochor, 504 U.S. at 540-41.
270. See supra notes 250-56 and accompanying text; infra part IV.C.2.
271. See infra app. at tbl. 3-d.
272. See United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2313 (1995); Shannon v. United
States, 512 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1994); Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994); Sullivan
v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993).
273. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 22-23; Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281.
274. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. at 2310.
275. Shannon, 512 U.S. at 584-87.
276. 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995).
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session of a gun in a locked trunk was insufficient to support a convic-
tion for use of the weapon in a drug offense.277 But despite its holding
that the defendants were improperly convicted, the Court did not
overturn those convictions, but instead remanded the case with in-
structions to reconsider the convictions under a prong of the law out-
lawing carrying a weapon. 78 The continued concern that the guilty
not benefit from a technicality, when combined with the narrow focus
of such decisions, indicates that the Rehnquist Court was more con-
cerned with refining its existing doctrine and protecting society from
criminals than with developing new, wide-ranging criminal law
jurisprudence.
Thus, by deciding a reduced percentage of the substantive issues
that the Burger Court concentrated on, the Rehnquist Court generally
seemed to be deferring to the Burger Court's and its own earlier re-
versals of criminal defendant protections.2 79 This case distribution co-
incides with the Rehnquist Court's interest in protecting the majority
at the expense of criminal rights. Moreover, the reduction in substan-
tive cases and increase in cases selected to clarify a lower court con-
flict has been described as a sign that the Court was "reducing the
volitional portion of its agenda and expanding the exigent agenda
space. '28 ° This conception is supported by the concentration on sen-
tencing and rules and interpretation cases which seem well suited to a
Court interested in maintenance of criminal law doctrine rather than
in instituting sweeping changes- 81 Further, after engaging in two par-
ticularly conservative terms with regard to criminal justice in 1989 and
1990,181 the Rehnquist Court had firmly established its preference for
sacrificing criminal rights to the majority's interest in law and order,
and may have been "forced to reign in lower court judges whose deci-
sions [were] too conservative." 3
277. Il at 504, 509.
278. Il
279. See Pacelle, Dynamics, supra note 15, at 254 ("Indeed, there is widespread
perception that the Rehnquist Court is interested in reversing or limiting the decisions
of the Warren Court."); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 35 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 197, 205-07 (1993) (arguing that with a few liberal
exceptions, the Rehnquist Court will continue to follow the rational basis model es-
tablished by Burger Court precedent).
280. Pacelle, Transformation, supra note 13, at 198.
281. See Pacelle, Dynamics, supra note 15, at 266 ("The raw numbers mask the
substantive nature of [the decline of agenda space allocated to civil liberties], particu-
larly in the Due Process area, in which cases concerned with the rights of prisoners
have increased during the past two decades to offset partially the large-scale declines
in criminal procedure cases.").
282. See Comiskey, supra note 29, at 262.




Interpreting the Rehnquist Court's criminal law agenda as reactive
might also explain why the Rehnquist Court found for criminal de-
fendants in over 50% of its substantive criminal law decisions:2s4 no
rediscovered sympathy for the accused, but rather a need to establish
the boundaries of its conservative criminal justice doctrine. This con-
ception of the Rehnquist Court's criminal law decisions would also
account for the difficulties numerous Rehnquist Court critics have had
in explaining away seemingly anomalous cases favorable to the ac-
cused in what is an otherwise relentlessly conservative criminal justice
Court.281
For example, while the Fourth Amendment search and seizure deci-
sions have been cited as evidence of the early Rehnquist Court's con-
servative shift,' two of the four search and seizure cases the
Rehnquist Court decided produced decisions favoring the defendant,
at least in part. 87 In Minnesota v. Dickerson, ss the Rehnquist Court
found unconstitutional a continued search of a suspect on the basis of
a lump in his pocket that was determined not to be a weapon. 2
9
Although the search yielded a bag of cocaine, because the officer was
uncertain of what the lump was after the initial pat-down, the Court
held that the officers did not have probable cause to reach into the
suspect's pocket to determine what the object was.' g Notably, this
decision provided a "strict conception"2 91 of the latitude police of-
ficers have under the reasonable search rule laid down by the Warren
Court in Terry v. Ohio.29"2
284. See infra app. at tbl. 3-d. The Rehnquist Court Justices have evinced discom-
fort with an apparent overreaction to some of its holdings, prompting Justice
O'Connor to issue a warning to lower court judges not to be "too hasty in rejecting
capital cases" based on Supreme Court rulings. Similarly, Justices Scalia and Ken-
nedy were reportedly clearly disturbed by an argument before them that the Constitu-
tion would permit state-sponsored religion as long as no one was coerced into joining.
Id.
285. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Hurley, Has the Supreme Court "Wrench[edl the Sixth
Amendment from Its Proper Context?", 24 U. Tol. L. Rev. 967, 991-94 (1993) (describ-
ing one Rehnquist Court decision as "the most liberal speedy trial decision to date").
286. See Friedelbaum, The Rehnquist Court, supra note 27, at 133-37 ("Fourth
Amendment rights, long objects of controversy and travail in the evolution of criminal
law, have been further eroded by a [Rehnquist] Court inclined to read the rights of
the accused in austere and unsympathetically literal terms.").
287. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1916, 1919 (1995) (requiring consider-
ation of the "knock and announce" rule to determine the reasonableness of the police
search under the Fourth Amendment); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379
(1993).
288. 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
289. Id at 379.
290. Id. at 378-79.
291. James B. Zagel, Drug Rhetoric Courts, and the Law: A Response to Professor
Rudovsky, 1994 U. Chi. Legal F. 275, 280.
292. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
1997] 2725
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
This decision is not necessarily a retreat from conservative criminal
jurisprudence, but may be instead an instance of defining the limits of
the conservative "peak" in criminal justice decisions in the 1990
term.293 Indeed, the Rehnquist Court refused to suppress evidence
improperly seized due to a clerical error,294 and allowed temporary
detention and search of an individual based on suspicion of a civil
traffic violation.295 Similarly, in its only Miranda case, the Rehnquist
Court stressed that "we must consider the other side of the Miranda
equation: The need for effective law enforcement. '296 Hence, the
Rehnquist Court remained concerned with protecting the safety of the
community, stating in United States v. Hensley,297 that "[r]estraining
police action until after probable cause is obtained would not only
hinder the investigation, but might also enable the suspect to flee in
the interim."2 98 In short, the Rehnquist Court did not abandon its
commitment to law and order. Instead, the Rehnquist Court estab-
lished the limits of its criminal justice precedents, providing form to
the conservative substance of its criminal law jurisprudence, and con-
tinuing to subjugate criminal rights to the majority's interest in effec-
tive law enforcement.
D. Summary
The Rehnquist Court, which otherwise increased protection of the
majority from government intrusion,299 apparently entered a period
of defining the boundaries of rather than expanding upon the basis of
its conservative criminal justice doctrine. Such moderation was absent
from the earlier Rehnquist Court terms300 because the early Rehn-
quist Court had not yet laid the foundation of its criminal law jurispru-
dence. But the marked decrease in substantive criminal cases as a
293. See Comiskey, supra note 29, at 262 (noting that there were at least 12 deci-
sions in which the defendant prevailed in the 1991 and 1992 terms after the Rehnquist
Court's conservatism "may have peaked in the 1990-91 term").
294. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1194-95 (1995).
295. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (1996).
296. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994).
297. 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
298. Id. at 229.
299. For example, the Rehnquist Court rendered decisions favoring the Federal
government in 64% of federal regulation and 69% of taxation cases, a significant de-
crease from the Burger Court's 78% favorable rate of decision in federal regulation
cases and 88% favorable rate of decision in taxation cases. Similarly, the Rehnquist
Court markedly decreased the percent of decisions favoring state and local govern-
ments, finding for state regulations of individuals only 38% of the time and for local
ordinances only 10% of the time. In contrast, the Burger Court ruled in favor of state
regulation of individuals 46% of the time and for in local ordinance cases 71% of the
time.
300. See Friedelbaum, The Rehnquist Court, supra note 27, at 129 ("Noticeably
missing was any effort to pursue a course of moderation and restraint which had
served to guide many Burger Court decisions in an era when adherence to the doc-
trine of stare decisis generally prevailed.").
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percentage of all criminal law decisions, combined with the sharp in-
crease in sentencing and rule and interpretation cases,301 depicts a
Court that constructed a reactive rather than revolutionary criminal
law agenda. Indeed, the Rehnquist Court seemingly moved into a pe-
riod of equilibrium, considering narrow issues and providing clarifica-
tion of the extent of Burger Court and early Relnquist Court
decisions. Criminal rights were not improved under the Rehnquist
Court, but instead remained subject to the majority's desire for law
and order.
CONCLUSION
At first blush, empirical data suggest that the Rehnquist Court is
not as conservative as is generally believed. Indeed, other observers
have reached this same conclusion, noting that the Rehnquist Court
"may be no more conservative than the Burger Court, which pre-
served and extended many of the liberal doctrines developed during
the Warren era. ' 302 One study indicated that, with regard to civil lib-
erties decisions, the Rehnquist Court had rendered essentially the
same percent of liberal decisions to that point (42.8%) as had the Bur-
ger Court.30 3 But as the authors of that study noted, "apparent liber-
alism may be overstated if analysts do not consider the kinds of issues
addressed. '"3o4
Additionally, as demonstrated here, it is important that the larger
categories be broken down into their component parts. For, while the
Rehnquist Court seemed to have a record similar to that of its prede-
cessor in civil rights cases,3 5 this grouping is deceptive, masking a
sharp change in how the Court treated minorities. While the courts
were for a short time considered a "haven" for minorities seeking re-
dress of racial injustice, this Note supports observers who now com-
plain that the Rehnquist Court "uses the very principles for which so
many people fought and died, against the very people whom they
were established to protect. '' 3° Moreover, the number of First
Amendment decisions that work against minority parties supports the
notion that the pattern seen in civil rights claims may not be the sim-
ple result of a rejection of affirmative action. Indeed, the "permissi-
bility of race-conscious state action is an area where the realignment
301. Sentencing cases accounted for 36% of Rehnquist Court and 13% of Burger
Court total criminal law cases, while rules and interpretation cases accounted for 43%
of Rehnquist Court and 31% of Burger Court total criminal law cases. See infra app.
at tbl. 3-d.
302. Smith & Hensley, supra note 13, at 89.
303. IL at 85. The Warren Court was credited with a 71.4% liberal decision rate.
Id
304. Id at 89.
305. See supra part ll.B.
306. Davis, The American Dilemma, supra note 32, at 640-41.
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of the Supreme Court is most directly evident. ' 30 7 If the Rehnquist
Court's only motive is to eliminate the harmful impact of using any
race-based classifications, even at the cost of losing worthwhile affirm-
ative action programs, the "question that the Court has not yet fully
answered is why these costs should be incurred in this area but in so
few others. ' 30 8 Instead, the current Court has appeared most con-
cerned with preventing minority groups from exerting pressure to dis-
advantage the majority. Under this system, hate speech laws and
affirmative action programs are equally suspect;309 criminal rights
"must yield to majoritarian preferences. 3 10 In light of this pattern of
decisions, the question when assessing the Rehnquist Court is not
whether its decisions are liberal or conservative, nor whether it is
hearing a Due Process or Equal Protection case. Instead, the simplest
question seems to yield the clearest response: Whose rights are at
stake? For minorities who reply "mine," there are few positive
answers.
307. Issacharoff, supra note 123, at 53.
308. David A. Strauss, Affirmative Action and the Public Interest, 1995 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 1, 42.
309. See supra parts III.C.2-3.
310. Ed Aro, Note, The Pretext Problem Revisited: A Doctrinal Exploration of Bad
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United States v. Frady
Connecticut v. Johnson
457 U.S. 537 (1982)
457 U.S. 687 (1982)
460 U.S. 491 (1983)
466 U.S. 740 (1984)
469 U.S. 221 (1985)
470 U.S. 675 (1985)
470 U.S. 811 (1985)
455 U.S. 104 (1982)
458 U.S. 782 (1982)
463 U.S. 939 (1983)
468 U.S. 447 (1984)
472 U.S. 320 (1985)
472 U.S. 372 (1985)
476 U.S. 147 (1986)
458 U.S. 858 (1982)
475 U.S. 673 (1986)
458 U.S. 279 (1982)
458 U.S. 747 (1982)
462 U.S. 356 (1983)
465 U.S. 482 (1984)
466 U.S. 475 (1984)
469 U.S. 70 (1984)
472 U.S. 675 (1985)
473 U.S. 207 (1985)
476 U.S. 16 (1986)
476 U.S. 530 (1986)
463 U.S. 418 (1983)
463 U.S. 476 (1983)
473 U.S. 667 (1985)
456 U.S. 667 (1982)
457 U.S. 31 (1982)
467 U.S. 203 (1984)
467 U.S. 493 (1984)
468 U.S. 317 (1984)
471 U.S. 773 (1985)
474 U.S. 82 (1985)
476 U.S. 140 (1986)
467 U.S. 39 (1984)
470 U.S. 1 (1985)
470 U.S. 68 (1985)
470 U.S. 522 (1985)
476 U.S. 683 (1986)
459 U.S. 248 (1983)
459 U.S. 553 (1983)
465 U.S. 420 (1984)
465 U.S. 605 (1984)
478 U.S. 364 (1986)
469 U.S. 38 (1984)
471 U.S. 409 (1985)
475 U.S. 387 (1986)
468 U.S. 339 (1984)
471 U.S. 130 (1985)
475 U.S. 66 (1986)
456 U.S. 152 (1982)

























































1997] THE REHNQUIST COURT 2737
Case Name Cite Subcategory
California v. Ramos
James v. Kentucky
New York v. Quarles
Shea v. Louisiana
Oregon v. Elstad
United States v. Goodwin
United States v. Hasting
Russello v. United States
California v. Trombetta
United States v. Abel
United States v. Powell
Wayte v. United States
United States v. Lane
Batson v. Kentucky
McElroy v. United States
United States v. Yermian




United States v. Cronic




United States v. Ross
United States v. Knotts
Texas v. Brown
Illinois v. Gates
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez
Illinois v. Lafayette




United States v. Jacobsen
Oliver v. United States
Florida v. Meyers
United States v. Karo
Segura v. United States
United States v. Leon
Massachusetts v. Sheppard
United States v. Johns
California v. Carney
Maryland v. Macon
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez
New York v. Class
New York v. PJ. Video, Inc.
California v. Ciraolo
Missouri v. Hunter
Tuten v. United States
Bearden v. Georgia
Wasman v. United States
Ball v. United States
Texas v. McCullough
Skipper v. South Carolina
McMillan v. Pennsylvania
United States v. MacDonald
United States v. Rojas-Contreras
463 U.S. 992 (1983)
466 U.S. 341 (1984)
467 U.S. 649 (1984)
470 U.S. 51 (1985)
470 U.S. 298 (1985)
457 U.S. 368 (1982)
461 U.S. 499 (1983)
464 U.S. 16 (1983)
467 U.S. 479 (1984)
469 U.S. 45 (1984)
469 U.S. 57 (1984)
470 U.S. 598 (1985)
474 U.S. 438 (1986)
476 U.S. 79 (1986)
455 U.S. 642 (1982)
468 U.S. 63 (1984)
471 U.S. 419 (1985)
472 U.S. 445 (1985)
462 U.S. 1039 (1983)
466 U.S. 648 (1984)
467 U.S. 180 (1984)
474 U.S. 159 (1985)
475 U.S. 625 (1986)
455 U.S. 1 (1982)
456 U.S. 798 (1982)
460 U.S. 276 (1983)
460 U.S. 730 (1983)
462 U.S. 213 (1983)
462 U.S. 579 (1983)
462 U.S. 640 (1983)
462 U.S. 696 (1983)
463 U.S. 765 (1983)
463 U.S. 1032 (1983)
464 U.S. 287 (1984)
466 U.S. 109 (1984)
466 U.S. 170 (1984)
466 U.S. 380 (1984)
468 U.S. 705 (1984)
468 U.S. 796 (1984)
468 U.S. 897 (1984)
468 U.S. 981 (1984)
469 U.S. 478 (1985)
471 U.S. 386 (1985)
472 U.S. 463 (1985)
473 U.S. 531 (1985)
475 U.S. 106 (1986)
475 U.S. 868 (1986)
476 U.S. 207 (1986)
459 U.S. 359 (1983)
460 U.S. 660 (1983)
461 U.S. 660 (1983)
468 U.S. 559 (1984)
470 U.S. 856 (1985)
475 U.S. 134 (1986)
476 U.S. 1 (1986)
477 U.S. 79 (1986)
456 U.S. 1 (1982)
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Case Name Cite Subcategory
United States v. Loud Hawk 474 U.S. 302 (1986) speedy trial
Henderson v. United States 476 U.S. 321 (1986) speedy trial
1991-1995 Terms
Powell v. Nevada










Loving v. United States
Hubbard v. United States
Bailey v. United States
United States v. Williams
United States v. Felix
Witte v. United States
Ornelas v. United States
United States v. Dixon
Riggins v. Nevada
Ryder v. United States
White v. Illinois
Medina v. California
Williamson v. United States
Tome v. United States
United States v. Mezzanatto
Carlisle v. United States
Sullivan v. Louisiana
Victor v. Nebraska
Shannon v. United States
United States v. Gaudin
Davis v. United States
Griffin v. United States
Jacobson v. United States
Evans v. United States
Georgia v. McCollum
United States v. Salerno
Crosby v. United States
Zafiro v. United States
Fex v. Michigan
Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States
United States v. Olano
Dept. of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch
Lewis v. United States
Ratzlaf v. United States
Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States
Staples v. United States
United States v. Shabani





Whren v. United States
Williams v. United States
United States v. Wilson
511 U.S. 79 (1994)
511 U.S. 350 (1994)
503 U.S. 159 (1992)
504 U.S. 527 (1992)
504 U.S. 719 (1992)
509 U.S. 350 (1993)
512 U.S. 1 (1994)
512 U.S. 154 (1994)
512 U.S. 967 (1994)
115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995)
116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996)
116 S. Ct. 1737 (1996)
115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995)
116 S. Ct. 501 (1995)
504 U.S. 36 (1992)
503 U.S. 378 (1992)
115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995)
116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996)
509 U.S. 688 (1993)
504 U.S. 127 (1992)
115 S. Ct. 2031 (1995)
502 U.S. 346 (1992)
505 U.S. 437 (1992)
512 U.S. 594 (1994)
115 S. Ct. 696 (1995)
115 S. Ct. 797 (1995)
116 S. Ct. 1460 (1996)
508 U.S. 275 (1993)
511 U.S. 1 (1994)
512 U.S. 573 (1994)
115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995)
512 U.S. 452 (1994)
502 U.S. 46 (1991)
503 U.S. 540 (1992)
504 U.S. 255 (1992)
505 U.S. 42 (1992)
505 U.S. 317 (1992)
506 U.S. 255 (1993)
506 U.S. 534 (1993)
507 U.S. 43 (1993)
507 U.S. 234 (1993)
507 U.S. 725 (1993)
511 U.S. 767 (1994)
116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996)
510 U.S. 135 (1994)
511 U.S. 513 (1994)
511 U.S. 600 (1994)
115 S. Ct. 382 (1994)
115 S. Ct. 2357 (1995)
506 U.S. 364 (1993)
508 U.S. 366 (1993)
115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995)
115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995)
116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)
503 U.S. 193 (1992)
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Case Name Cite Subcategory
United States v. Dunnigan
Stinson v. United States
Deal v. United States
Smith v. United States
Wisconsin v. Mitchell
United States v. Granderson
Beecham v. United States
Custis v. United States
Nichols v. United States
Neal v. United States
Rutledge v. United States
Koon v. United States
Melendez v. United States
Doggett v. United States
507 U.S. 87 (1993)
508 U.S. 36 (1993)
508 U.S. 129 (1993)
508 U.S. 223 (1993)
508 U.S. 476 (1993)
511 U.S. 39 (1994)
511 U.S. 368 (1994)
511 U.S. 485 (1994)
511 U.S. 738 (1994)
116 S. CL 763 (1996)
116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996)
116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996)
116 S. C. 2057 (1996)
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TABLE 2-a
ALL CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
[Vol. 65
Discrimination Claims 1991-1995 % Total* 1981-1985 % Total*
for Accused Discriminator 31.7% 5.1% 29.2% 7.1%
for Minority 68.3% 70.8%
Voting Right Claims
for Government 64% 2.7% 25% 1.2%
for Challenger 36% 75%
42 U.S.C. 1983 Claims
for Government 47% 2.9% 65% 3.0%
for Plaintiff 53% 35%
Tribal Rights Claims
for Government 75% 1.6% 39% 2.2%
for Tribe 25% 61%
* Percent of Adjusted Total Decisions
TABLE 2-b
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS ONLY
Race-based Claims 1991-1995 % Total* 1981-1985 % Total*
for Accused Discriminator 75% 30.8% 36% 43.9%
for Minority 25% 64%
Gender-based Claims
for Accused Discriminator 20% 19.2% 25% 21.1%
for Minority 80% 75%
Age-based Claims
for Accused Discriminator 33% 11.5% 0% 7.0%
for Minority 67% 100%
Other Discrimination Claims
for Accused Discriminator 50% 38.5% 66% 28.1%
for Minority 50% 34%
* Percent of all Discrimination Decisions
TABLE 2-c
FIRST AMENDMENT CASES
Expression 1991-1995 % Total* 1981-1985 % Total*
for Freedom of Expression 79% 5.1% 52% 3.3%
for Restriction of Expression 21% 48%
Establishment
for Religious Expression 71% 1.4% 42% 1.5%
for Restriction of Expression 29% 58%
* Percent of Adjusted Total Decisions
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TABLE 2-d
ALL CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASES
Criminal Justice 1991-1995 % Total* 1981-1985 % Total*
for Government 66% 13.7% 73% 14.3%
for Defendant 34% 27%
Habeas Corpus
for Government 63% 5.3% 75% 6.8%
for Defendant 37% 25%
* Percent of Adjusted Total Decisions




Sub-Category Total Cases For Minority Total Cases For Minority
# %* # %** # %* # %**.
Desegregation 2.0 8.0% 1.0 50.0% 2.0 25.0% 1.0 50.0%
Racial Classification 6.0 24.0% 4.0 66.7% 4.0 50.0% 1.0 25.0%
Job Discrimination 14.0 56.0% 9.0 64.3% 2.0 25.0% 0.0 0.0%
Institutional Racism 3.0 12.0% 2.0 66.7% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0%
TOTAL 25.0 16.0 64.0% 8.0 2.0 25.0%
* Percent of total racial discrmination decisions.
** Percent for minorities.
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Sub-Topic Total Cases For Expression Total Cases ForExpression
# %* # %* W %& # %o
Cable Regulation 1.0 3.7% 1.0 100.0% 2.0 7.7% 1.0 50.0%
Campaign Regulation 6.0 22.2% 4.0 66.7% 3.0 11.5% 3.0 100.0%
Commercial Speech 3.0 11.1% 2.0 66.7% 7.0 26.9% 5.0 71.4%
Content 6.0 22.2% 1.0 16.7% 7.0 26.9% 6.0 85.7%
Intragovermmenta 4.0 14.8% 1.0 25.0% 3.0 11.5% 3.0 100.0%
Public/Non-Public Forum 3.0 11.1% 2.0 66.7% 3.0 11.5% 2.0 66.7%
Press Access 2.0 7.4% 2.0 100.0% 0.0 0.0% n/a n/a
Protest 2.0 7.4% 1.0 50.0% 1.0 3.8% 0.5 50.0%
TOTALS 27.0 14.0 51.9% 26.0 20.5 78.8%
* Percent of total free speech decisions.
** Percent favoring free speech.




Sub-Category Total Cases ForDefendant Total Cases For Defendant
# %* # %** # %* # %**
Arrest 7.0 6.1% 5.0 71.4% 2.0 2.9% 1.0 50.0%
Capital Sentencing 7.0 6.1% 3.0 42.9% 10.0 14.3% 5.0 50.0%
Confrontation Clause 3.0 2.6% 1.5 50.0% 0.0 0.0% n/a n/a
Definition 9.0 7.8% 2.0 22.2% 2.0 2.9% 2.0 100.0%
Disclosure 3.0 2.6% 2.0 66.7% 1.0 1.4% 0.0 0.0%
Double Jeopardy 8.0 7.0% 2.0 25.0% 4.0 5.7% 1.5 37.5%
Fair Trial 5.0 4.3% 3.0 60.0% 2.0 2.9% 2.0 100.0%
Fifth Amendment 5.0 4.3% 1.5 30.0% 0.0 0.0% n/a n/a
Hearsay 3.0 2.6% 0.0 0.0% 5.0 7.1% 1.0 20.0%
Indictment 3.0 2.6% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% n/a n/a
Jury Instruction 4.0 3.5% 1.0 25.0% 4.0 5.7% 1.0 25.0%
Miranda Rights 3.0 2.6% 1.0 33.3% 1.0 1.4% 0.0 0.0%
Proof 4.0 3.5% 1.0 25.0% 5.0 7.1% 2.5 50.0%
Right to Counsel 5.0 4.3% 2.0 40.0% 1.0 1.4% 0.0 0.0%
Search & Seizure 25.0 21.7% 1.5 6.0% 4.0 5.7% 1.5 37.5%
Sentencing 8.0 7.0% 3.0 37.5% 15.0 21.4% 2.5 16.7%
Speedy Trial 4.0 3.5% 0.0 0.0% 1.0 1.4% 1.0 100.0%
Miscellaneous 9.0 7.8% 1.0 11.1% 13.0 18.6% 2.0 15.4%
TOTAL 115.0 30.5 26.5% 70.0 23.0 32.9%
* Percent of total criminal law decisions.
** Percent for defendants.




Subjects Total Cases For Defendant Total Cases For Defendant
# %* # '**  % - %
Substantive 65.0 56.5% 17.5 26.9% 15.0 21.4% 8.0 53.3%
Sentencing 15.0 13.1% 6.0 40.0% 25.0 35.7% 7.5 30.0%
Rules & Interpretation 35.0 30.4% 7.0 20.0% 30.0 42.9% 8.5 28.3%
115.0 30.5 26.5% 70.0 24.0 34.3%
* Percent of total criminal law decisions.
** Percent for defendants.

